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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The above entitled Cross-Appeal is from a judgment granted by
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
in favor of Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

The court has jurisdiction

to hear this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(k)•
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(1) Did the trial court commit reversible error in finding
that the evidence at trial concerning fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation, breach of contract, and mutual mistake were
insufficient to warrant rescission of the contract between the
parties?

The standard of review for this issue is a review of

appropriateness of the exercise of the trial court's discretion.
Bambrouah v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976); Reeves v.
Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The standard for reviewing whether the trial court has properly
exercised its discretion is the following:
[W]here the lower tribunal, acting within the scope of
its authority, has conducted a hearing and arrived at a
decision, the reviewing court will examine only the
certified record; and will not interfere with matters of
discretion or upset the action of the lower tribunal
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess
of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary.
Peatross v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 284
(Utah 1976) (citations omitted).
(2) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying
the Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, seeking to add
three causes of action for constructive trust, fraudulent transfer,
and injunctive relief?

The standard of appellate review for this

issue is the same as for Issue (1) above.
1

(3) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying
the Motion to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyance, seeking to have the
conveyance set aside of an interest in a promissory note from
individuals to their trusts?

The standard of appellate review for

this issue is the same as for Issue (1) above.
(4) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying
the Motion for Order Declaring Trusts Invalid, seeking to have
trusts declared invalid?

The standard of appellate review of this

issue is the same as for Issue (1) above.
(5) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking to have the
Counterclaim dismissed as to one party, based upon the doctrine of
election of remedies?

The standard of appellate review for this

issue is the same as for Issue (1) above.
(6) Did the trial court commit reversible error in dismissing
the bankruptcy trustee from this action? The standard of appellate
review on this issue is the same as for Issue (1) above.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
(1) A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if
the pleading is one of which no responsive pleading is
permitted and the action has not been placed upon the
trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of
the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, U.C.A. §25-6-5, the
full text of which is found in the Addendum to this Brief.

2

(3) A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party
in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave
any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the
court shall order that he be made a party.
Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I,

Nature of the Case, This is a breach of contract action

involving the purchase of a self service carwash in Layton, Utah,
brought by Cross-Appellant Fairfield Carwash Corporation, f/k/a
American Vending Services, Inc., a Utah corporation ("Fairfield")
against Appellant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust ("Trust")
originally with Wayne L. Morse and Dianne L. Morse improperly
acting as Trustees, and against the Dianne L. Morse Irrevocable
Family Trust and the Morses individually (R. at 2-34).

The Morses

and their Trusts also brought a Counterclaim for breach of the same
contract against Fairfield and seeking individual liability of the
shareholders of Fairfield, Kevin S. Garn and Douglas M. Durbano
(R. at 40-44, 206-17).
II,

Course of Proceedings Below,

On October 31, 1985,

Fairfield filed a Complaint against the Morses and their Trusts,
seeking to rescind an agreement to purchase a carwash, based upon
misrepresentation and/or mutual mistake (R. at 2-34).

On December

11, 1985, the Morses individually and as Trustees of their Trusts
answered the Complaint and filed a Counterclaim against Fairfield
3

for breach of contract in failing to make payment on a promissory
note (R. at 40-44).

On November 10, 1988, the Morses were allowed

by the trial court to file an Amended Counterclaim, naming G a m and
Durbano as additional Counterclaim Defendants, seeking judgment
against them individually for the obligations of Fairfield (R. at
206-17).

Prior to trial, the Morses were dismissed individually

from the action and Brent Dopp was substituted as proper Trustee of
the Trusts (R. at 1512-14, 1735-38). By stipulation, the Dianne L.
Morse Irrevocable Family Trust was also dismissed (R. at 1960).
The Trustee of the Morses' bankruptcy, David Gladwell, was added as
a Defendant/Counterclaimant (R. at 1001) but later dismissed by the
court prior to trial (R. at 1735-38).

During the protracted

pendency of this action, a number of motions were filed by all
parties involved in the litigation.

Many of the motions filed by

Fairfield and/or G a m and Durbano were dispositive. However, some
of these motions were denied by the court without explanation.
III.

Disposition in the Court Below,

At the conclusion of

the trial of this matter, which commenced on October 15, 1991, the
trial

court granted

Counterclaim

against

judgment

in

favor of

Fairfield, dismissed

the Trust
the

Trust's

on its
claims

against Durbano and G a m , finding no individual liability for the
corporate obligation, and dismissed Fairfield's claims against the
Trust (R. at 2026-28).

Although, the Trust sought an award of

attorney's fees in the amount of $112,435.00, the trial court
awarded $11,243.00, as a reasonable attorneys fee (R. at 2231-34).
The lower court also ordered that future pleadings in the action
should refer to Plaintiff as Fairfield Carwash Corporation, f/k/a
4

American Vending Services, Inc., a copy of which order is found in
the Addendum to this Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
(1) During the summer of 1984, Wayne and Dianne Morse,
through Morse Construction Company, constructed the Washing Machine
Carwash

("Carwash"), located at 210/220 North Fairfield Road,

Layton, Davis County, Utah (R. at 2793).
(2) The Morses operated the Carwash for approximately one (1)
year, at which time they entered into negotiations with Fairfield
for the sale of the Carwash, as an on going business (R. at 2021,
2791).
(3)

Early in the negotiations on the Carwash, Durbano and

Garn determined that they would form a corporation to purchase the
Carwash from the Morses.

Throughout the negotiations for the

purchase, the Morses knew that Durbano and Garn intended to form a
corporation for this purpose (R. at 2021, 2369-73, 2458, 2496-98,
2605-06, 2612-13, 2617-18, 2661-66).
(4) The Morses intended to contract with a corporation,
rather than with Durbano and Garn individually (R. at 2023, 2458,
2496-98, 2663, 2868, 2874-76).
(5) An

attorney

representing

the

Morses

reviewed

the

transaction documents prior to closing and made no objection to a
corporate buyer (R. at 2022, 2366-67, 2798-99, 2805-07).
(6) During the negotiations on the Carwash, Durbano and Garn
decided on the corporate name American Food Services, Inc., and
filed Articles of Incorporation with the State of Utah.

The

Articles were rejected and returned because the name American Food
5

Services,

Inc., conflicted

with

an

existing

corporate name.

Durbano and Garn then changed the corporate name to American Food
and Vending Services and submitted Articles of Incorporation a
second time.

The Articles were again rejected because of name

conflict. Both sets of Articles were submitted prior to July, 1985
(R. at 2021-22, 2456-57, 2500, 2509, 2582-84).
(7)
use

of

On June 28, 1985, Durbano obtained pre-approval for the
the

name

American

Vending

Services,

Inc.,

for

the

corporation (R. at 2022, 2365-66).
(8)

Durbano and Garn intended to have the Articles of

Incorporation on the approved name filed prior to closing but
failed to accomplish the filing until August 19, 1985, due to the
distraction of Durbano opening a new law office just prior to the
closing, the closing itself, and the process of commencing business
(R. at 2023,

2359-59A,

2456-57,

2582-84, 2661; Plaintiff's

Exhibit 1).
(9)

Fairfield

was

always

treated

separately

from

the

partnership that Durbano and Garn also owned, and the two rejected
Articles

of

Incorporation

resulted

from

efforts

to

form

a

corporation for the purpose of buying the Carwash (R. at 2456,
2458, 2496, 2498, 2521, 2586, 2605, 2618, 2638, 2648, 2661-66).
(10)

The efforts of Durbano and Garn in filing Articles of

Incorporation, obtaining pre-approval for the name American Vending
Services, Inc., and negotiating with the Morses as a corporation
prior to the closing, constitute a bona fide attempt to organize
the corporation (R. at 2022).

6

(11)

Fairfield was a de facto corporation and a corporation

by estoppel at the time it purchased the Carwash (R. at 2024).
(12)

None of the documents executed in connection with the

sale of the Carwash were executed by either Durbano or G a m
individually (R. at 2022; Plaintiff's Exhibits 5, 8, 9, and 11).
All documents were prepared for a corporate signature "by" "its"
officers and were signed by officers of the corporation only. The
buyer was a corporation and all property was sold and conveyed to
the corporation (R. at 2022, 2024, 2875-76).
(13)

Following

the

closing,

Fairfield

continued

doing

business by obtaining a checking account, operating the Carwash,
issuing stock, and holding meetings (R. at 2022, 2385, 2391-92,
2403-05, 2463-64, 2553-55, 2618-19, 2638, 2656-59; Plaintiff's
Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 ) .
(14)

Due to a name change in 1990, American Vending

Services, Inc. is now known as Fairfield Carwash Corporation (R. at
2023, 2459; Plaintiff's Exhibit 4).
(15)

On July 10, 1985, the Morses and Fairfield executed an

Agreement for Purchase and Sale ("Agreement") on the Carwash,
pursuant to which Fairfield paid a down payment of $20,000.00 and
executed a Promissory Note in the amount of $45,000.00 (Plaintiff's
Exhibits 5 and 8).

On that same day, the Morses transferred their

interest in the Promissory Note to the Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable
Family Trust and the Dianne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust
("Trusts") (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8).
(16) Pursuant to the Agreement, the Morses provided to Fairfield an income statement, an appraisal, and other information
7

concerning the Carwash, which information was later incorporated by
reference into the Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibits 6 and 7).
(17)

The income statement, appraisal, and other information

provided to Fairfield, which the Morses' certified as accurate,
were material facts (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5; R. at 2369, 2378-80,
2472-74, 2478, 2480-84, 2593-96, 2606-07, 2612-13, 2625-35, 2810).
(18) The income statement, the appraisal, and the other
information concerning the Carwash, which were provided by the
Morses to Fairfield, were false and misrepresented the true value
and financial expectancy of the Carwash (Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 7,
18, 19, 22-27, 29-34; R. at 2403, 2617, 2690, 2699, 2960, 2985).
(19) Mr. Morse either knew the income was overstated in the
income statement provided, or he recklessly certified the accuracy
of the income without any knowledge concerning it (R. at 2836).
(20) Fairfield relied on the financial statements, appraisal,
and other information provided by the Morses in deciding to
purchase the Carwash, which reliance was reasonable (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 5; R. at 2379-81, 2473, 2476, 2557-58, 2593-97, 2606-07,
2612-13, 2625-29, 2632-36, 2801-05, 2843).
(21)

Fairfield was damaged by the misrepresentations in the

amount of $77,304,20 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 40).
(22)

Three and one half months after the closing under the

Agreement, Fairfield acted promptly and unequivocally to rescind
the Agreement and filed this action in the lower court against the
Morses and their Trusts to rescind the Agreement and for damages
and tendered the Carwash back to the Morses (R. at 2-34, 2023,
2386, 2392-2400, 2407).
8

(23)

The Morses and their Trusts answered and admitted the

corporate existence of Fairfield; they also Counterclaimed and
affirmatively alleged the corporate existence of Fairfield and
subsequently served a Notice of Default upon Durbano as registered
agent of Fairfield (R. at 40-44, 2023, 2431; Plaintiff's Exhibit
41).
(24)

On February 12, 1986, the Morses filed for personal

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, No. 86C-00598.

David L. Gladwell was

appointed Trustee in the proceeding.
(25)

On February 29, 1988, Fairfield voluntarily surrendered

the Carwash to the first mortgage holder (Ogden First Federal
Savings and Loan) who then proceeded to foreclose on the property
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13).

Neither the Morses nor their Trusts bid

at the foreclosure sale.
(26)

On October 25, 1988, the Morses and their Trusts were

granted leave of court to file a third-party action against Durbano
and Garn individually, alleging that Fairfield lacked corporate
existence on July 10, 1985 (R. at 206-217).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
clearly

The overwhelming evidence submitted at trial established
and

convincingly

all

of

the

elements

misrepresentation as required by Utah law.

of

fraudulent

The evidence was even

stronger in supporting a finding of negligence misrepresentation,
material breach, and/or mutual mistake. For that reason, the trial
court should have rescinded the Agreement.
II.

Fairfield's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

did not raise any new matter and was brought seven months before

9

trial.

Based upon the liberal construction that Utah law requires

of Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Fairfield's Motion
should have been granted.
III.

Although the Morses sold the Carwash individually,

simultaneously with the closing, the Morses apparently transferred
their interest in the Carwash, in the $20,000.00 downpayment and in
the Promissory Note, to their Trusts, without any consideration
being paid for the transfer.

Seven months later, they filed a

petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Based
upon the application of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to
these facts, the trial court should have found this transfer to be
fraudulent and granted Fairfield's Motion to have the transfer set
aside.
IV.

Prior to Fairfield's Motion for Order Declaring Trusts

Invalid, the proper Trustees of the Trusts never acted as such, the
Morses improperly commandeered the administration of the Trusts
from inception, and no property was ever delivered to the proper
Trustees of the Trust. Based upon Utah law, the Trusts should have
been found by the trial court to be nothing more than a sham.

For

that reason, the trial court should have granted Fairfield's Motion
to have the Trusts declared invalid.
V.

In response to a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

Durbano and G a m , seeking dismissal of them individually from this
action, the Morses submitted Affidavits in which they swore that,
from beginning to end, as far as they knew, they only dealt with
individuals and not with any corporate entity.

This position is

repugnant and contradictory to any claim the Morses still asserted
10

against Fairfield in their Counterclaim.

Based upon the doctrine

of election of remedies, the trial court should have held the
Morses to their election and dismissed Fairfield from this action.
VI.

Although the trial court initially granted the Motion to

add the Morses' Bankruptcy Trustee as the real party in interest in
this action, such ruling was later reversed, based upon a finding
that Mr. Gladwell would be precluded from filing a fraudulent
conveyance action.

However, a fraudulent conveyance action would

be unnecessary had the trial court granted any one of Fairfield's
Motions, i.e., declaring the trusts invalid, finding the conveyance
fraudulent, or amending the Complaint to add a cause of action for
fraudulent transfer.

Thus, should this court reverse the trial

court's decision on any of these other three Motions, Mr. Gladwell
should also be added as the real party in interest and the only
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
VII.

The construction given to U.C.A. §16-10-51 by the Utah

Supreme Court in Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 407 P. 2d
683 (Utah 1965), is still good law in Utah and was properly applied
by the trial court to the facts of this case. In addition, Vincent
Drug does not require that Articles of Incorporation be filed
before a de facto corporation can be found, but only that a bona
fide attempt to organize the corporation has occurred. Based upon
Vincent Drug, this court should affirm the trial court's finding
that Fairfield existed de. facto on July 10, 1985.
VIII. The doctrine of corporation by estoppel will be applied
to prevent a party from denying the existence of a corporation if
they have either

(1) dealt with or contracted with it as a
11

corporation, or (2) admitted the corporate existence in an answer
or counterclaim filed in an action brought by the corporation.
Since Utah does recognize this doctrine, the trial court properly
found that as to the parties to this lawsuit, Fairfield was a
corporation by estoppel at the time of the closing on July 10,
1985.

Although most states have adopted the Model Business

Corporation Act in one form or another, most states still recognize
the doctrine

of de. facto

corporation

and

almost

recognize the doctrine of corporation of estoppel.

all

states

For that

reason, this court should affirm the trial court's finding that
Fairfield was a corporation by estoppel on July 10, 1985.
IX.

The Trust was not prejudiced by the trial court's

consideration of responsive memoranda on the issue of attorney's
fees filed a few days late pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of
Judicial Administration, because the Trust failed to submit the
matter to the decision of the court by filing a proper Notice. In
addition, the trial court did not prejudice the Trust by ruling on
the issue without consideration of a reply memorandum and revised
Affidavit of Attorney Fees, since the Trust had submitted a belated
Notice, which it failed to withdraw. Thus, the trial court's award
of attorney's fees should not be set aside based upon any violation
of Rule 4-501.
X.

Fairfield's position on its Complaint and Answer to the

Counterclaim was not untenable or unmeritorious, precluding a
finding of abuse of discretion in the award of attorney's fees.
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).

Based upon

the general principles and practical guidelines set out by the Utah
12

Supreme Court in Dixie State Bankf however, the trial court was
well within its discretion in awarding attorney's fees in the
amount of $11,243.00.
XI.

Should Fairfield be successful on this appeal, it should

be awarded its attorney's fees incurred in the appeal, as well as
those incurred

in the underlying

action, including

all fees

incurred on behalf of Durbano and Garn.

ARGUMENT
I.
The Evidence Before the Trial Court was Sufficient to
Warrant Rescission of the Agreement.
At the trial of this matter, Fairfield submitted evidence
justifying rescission of the Agreement based upon: (1) fraudulent
misrepresentation; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) material
breach; and (4) mutual mistake. In spite of overwhelming evidence
supporting all of these theories, the trial court refused to
rescind the Agreement.

Based upon the evidence, as discussed

below, this court should reverse the trial court and find that
rescission was warranted.
A.

Fraudulent Misrepresentation.

The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are set forth
clearly in the case of Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d
124 (Utah 1982), as follows:
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning
a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false;
(4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for
the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it;
13

(6) that the other party acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it;
(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and
damage•
Id- at 126 (citation omitted).

Silence may be an actionable

misrepresentation where it relates to a material matter known to
one party, and which it is his duty to communicate to the other
contracting party as a result of a relationship of trust between
the parties, or as a result of an inequality of the knowledge of
the parties. Elder v. Clawson, 384 P. 2d 802, 804-05 (Utah 1963);
See also, Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373
(Utah 1980).
In

the

case

at

bar,

fraudulent misrepresentation.

the

evidence

clearly

established

One representation was made in the

form of a five page income statement on the Carwash, admitted as
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.

Page 4 of the income statement clearly

represents that the average monthly income on the property was
projected to be $6,760.83 with office rent, and $5,830.83 without
office rent, and that the net profit would be at least $20,000.00
yearly.

An additional representation was made in the form of an

appraisal of the Carwash, admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 7.

The

testimony of Durbano and Garn clearly established that the represented income, and value of the Carwash based upon the appraisal,
were material facts.
Voluminous evidence was submitted at trial that the misrepresentation of income was in fact false. Durbano, Garn and Mr. Bart
Kennington all testified that the Carwash never made more than
$2,400.00
2617,

during any one month that they operated it (R. at 2403,

2690,

2699).

This

testimony
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was

also

supported

by

Plaintiff's Exhibits 18, 19, 22 and 24. That the Morses also never
realized the income represented is supported by the fact that they
were often late on the first mortgage payment (Plaintiff's Exhibit
32).

The Morse's tax returns for 1984 and 1985, admitted as

Plaintiff's Exhibits 26 and 29 respectfully, show somewhat higher
per month income, $4,690.50 for 1984, and $4,500.83 for 1985.l
However, the deposits made into the Morses' carwash account in
1984, admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 24, were only $18,124.38,
which is a monthly average of $3,020.73. This figure was confirmed
by the worksheet subpoenaed from the Morses' accountant, admitted
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 252, showing that the difference between the
revenue reported on the tax return and the cash deposits consisted
of $10,019.00 in unidentified non-cash deposits during the year.
Since all income from a carwash is in coins or currency, the
additional deposits must have not have been income from the
Carwash.

Mrs. Morse testified that the accountant's worksheet

showed all the income of the Carwash except for a small amount
taken out for supplies (R. at 2960).

1

Mr. Morse testified at trial that he fraudulently failed to
report all the Carwash income on his tax returns (R. at 2817-18),
a fact which, no doubt, affected his credibility at trial.
2

The Morses' accountant, Linda Riffle, testified that the
preliminary total on the deposit summary in her work papers
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 25) matched to the penny the summary of
deposits to the Carwash account (Plaintiff's Exhibit 24). She
further testified that the additional income of $10,019 written on
the work papers came from deposits to other bank accounts and
subsequent transfers to the Carwash account (R. at 3007-08).
However, no satisfactory explanation was ever provided at trial as
to why income from the Carwash would be deposited into a different
account and then transferred into the Carwash account, as opposed
to being deposited properly in the first place.
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In 1985, the worksheet from the Morses' accountant, admitted
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 27, also showed only $12,592.09 in cash
receipts for 1985, resulting in a monthly average of $2,098.68. In
addition, the subpoenaed records of water and electricity usage at
the Carwash, admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibits 33 and 34 respectively, reflect comparable usage of both water and electricity by
the Morses and by Fairfield.
income

achieved.

Similar utility usage infers similar

Finally,

although

the

income

statement

represented a yearly profit of at least $20,000.00, the Morses' tax
returns showed losses on the Carwash of $59,084.00 and $27,005.00
for 1984 and 1985 respectively. Thus, the evidence is overwhelming
that the income of the Carwash was substantially misrepresented in
the income statement provided to Fairfield.

The drastic reduction

in the 1988 appraisal from $366,000 to $200,000 also established
that the original appraisal greatly misrepresented the value of the
Carwash (Plaintiff's Exhibit 23). 3
Fairfield has always alleged that it would be hard for Mr.
Morse not to know that the represented income was false. However,
even in the event Mr. Morse did not know, he testified that he had
nothing to do with depositing the income from the Carwash (R. at
2836). Without any knowledge concerning the income of the Carwash
and the appraisal, his action in certifying that they were accurate
is

certainly

reckless

conduct,

3

satisfying

this

element

of

This was due, at least in part, to the fact that the
appraiser relied totally on information provided to him by Mr.
Morse in preparing the original appraisal (R. at 2861).
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fraudulent misrepresentation.4

The purpose of the represented

income and value, as reflected in paragraph 9(f) of the Agreement5,
was to induce Fairfield to purchase the Carwash, satisfying element
number 5 of fraudulent misrepresentation. The Agreement states and
both Durbano and G a m testified that Fairfield did act in reasonable reliance and in ignorance of the falsity of the representations.

Mr. Morse also testified that he knew Fairfield would be

relying on the income statement and appraisal in the purchase of
the Carwash (R. at 2801-05, 2843).
At trial, the Morses challenged the reasonableness of Fairfield's reliance, suggesting that Fairfield should have asked to
see the Morses' tax returns to clarify the income realized.
However, Durbano was told by Mr. Morse that not all income was
included on his tax returns (R. at 2380-81).

Thus, Fairfield

reasonably determined not to ask for the tax returns, because they
would not accurately represent the income.

In reality, the tax

returns included more income than was actually generated by the
Carwash, and reliance by Fairfield on them prior to closing would
have amounted to an additional misrepresentation. The Morses also

Mr. Morses' motivation in his intentional or reckless
conduct can be found in his anxiety to close (R. at 2872) because
of his "dire [financial] straits" at the time of closing (R. at
2859), resulting in bankruptcy a few months later (R. at 2862-63).
5

Paragraph 9(f) of the Agreement states in relevant part:
"All of the foregoing described documents are true and complete and
have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
and appraisal principles and each of which accurately presents the
results of the appraisers and accountants and Sellers represent and
warrant that they are true and accurate to the best of their
knowledge, since it is specifically understood that the Buyer has
substantially relied on these documents in the purchase of the
above-described assets and property."
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challenged Fairfield's reasonable reliance on the appraisal, based
upon the discrepancies found therein. However, as Durbano and Garn
both testified, the appraisal was based upon projected income, and
the discrepancy between it and the income statement provided by the
Morses did not trigger any further investigation (R. at 2481-83,
2629-30).
And finally, Fairfield was damaged as a result of the Morses
fraudulent misrepresentation, a summary of which was admitted as
Exhibit 40, in the amount of $77,304.20. Thus, all of the elements
found in Mikkelson for fraudulent misrepresentation were clearly
established at trial. For that reason, the trial court should have
ordered rescission of the Agreement.
B.

Negligent Misrepresentation.

The Utah Supreme Court has set forth very similar elements to
be proven at an action for negligent representation as follows:
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest in a
transaction, (2) is in a superior position to know
material facts, and (3) carelessly or negligently makes
a false representation concerning them, (4) expecting the
other party to rely and act thereon, and (5) the other
party reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in that
transaction, the representor can be held responsible if
the other elements of fraud are also present.
Christianson v. Com. Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah
1983).

In a later case, the Court ruled that there was no

additional requirement that the other elements of fraud need be
established in a negligent misrepresentation case. Price-Orem Inv.
v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 713 P.2d 55, 59 n.2 (Utah 1986).
The discussion above on fraudulent misrepresentation need only
be summarized again to show that negligent misrepresentation was
also established at trial.

Mr. Morse and/or his Trust certainly
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had a pecuniary interest in this transaction.

There is also no

question that Mr. Morse was in a superior position to know
materials facts concerning the operation of the Carwash and its
profitability.

Assuming Mr. Morse did not know of the falsity of

his income representations or the appraisal, his certification to
their accuracy in the Agreement was certainly a careless or
negligent act, satisfying element number three.

Mr. Morse made

such representations expecting Fairfield to rely and act thereon,
which Fairfield reasonably did, suffering damages as outlined
above.

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court

should have found that Mr. Morse had made negligent representations for which Fairfield should have been provided a remedy.
It has long been the law in the State of Utah that the
plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option to "elect to
rescind the transaction and recover the purchase price or to affirm
the transaction and recover damages."
1239, 1247 (Utah 1980).

Dugan v. Jones, 615 P. 2d

"The choice of remedy belongs to the

victim of the fraud, and a choice cannot be forced upon him."
(citations omitted).

Id.

The only requirement placed upon a plaintiff

is that, if he desires to rescind the contract upon the ground of
misrepresentation or fraud, he "must act promptly and unequivocally
in announcing his intention."

Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813, 815

(Utah 1968).
The evidence presented at trial clearly established that
Fairfield

did

unequivocally.

choose

to

rescind

the Agreement

promptly and

Upon discovery of the problem, Durbano contacted

Mr. Morse immediately by telephone and communicated to him that the
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Carwash was not bringing in sufficient money to make even the first
mortgage payment (R. at 2386).

Durbano called a meeting at his

office on October 2, 1985, at which time Mr. Morse made some
suggestions concerning the operation of the Carwash (R. at 23922400).

After trying Mr. Morse's suggestions for another three

weeks, Durbano met with Mr. Morse at his office and tendered
possession of the Carwash back to him (R. at 2407).

Upon Mr.

Morse's rejection of the tender, Fairfield immediately filed this
lawsuit.

Thus, Fairfield did act promptly and unequivocally in

announcing its intention to rescind the Agreement.

Based upon

fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, the trial court should
have found that rescission of the Agreement was proper.
C.

Material Breach of Contract.

The Utah Supreme Court has also established that rescission as
a remedy is available for a material breach of contract as follows:
As a general proposition, a party to a contract has
a right of rescission and an action for restitution as an
alternative to an action for damages where there has been
a material breach of the contract by the other party.
What constitutes so serious a breach as to justify
rescission is not easily reduced to precise statement,
but certainly a failure of performance which "defeats the
very object of the contract" or [is] of such prime
importance that the contract would not have been made if
default in that particular had been completed" is a
material failure.
Polvalvcoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d

449, 451

(Utah 1979)

(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Both Durbano and G a m

testified that they would not have

entered into the Agreement but for the income representations made
and certified by Mr. Morse (R. at 2596-97, 2612-13).

The evidence

at trial established that the income generated by both Mr. Morse
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and Fairfield in the operation of the Carwash was approximately
$2,400.00 per month.

The represented income was $5,800.00 per

month, more than twice the actual income.

The trial court should

have found that such a great discrepancy between represented income
and actual income was a material breach of the Agreement.

Based

upon such material breach, Fairfield should have been permitted to
rescind the Agreement.
D.

Mutual Mistake.

Based upon the evidence presented at trial, Fairfield should
also have been permitted to rescind the Agreement for mutual
mistake. The doctrine of mutual mistake applies where both parties
are mistaken concerning an existing fact, on which the parties
based their contract.

Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah

1982); Smith v. Pearman, 548 P.2d 1269, 1270 (Utah 1976).

The

remedy of rescission of contract may be granted when mutual mistake
is proven.

Id.

The evidence presented

at trial clearly established, as

outlined above, that the representation of income made to Fairfield
before and as part of the Agreement was inaccurate.6

Even if the

evidence was insufficient to establish fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation, in the very least, the evidence established that
the parties made a material mistake concerning the level of income
produced by the Carwash.

Upon proof of this mutual mistake, the

trial court should have rescinded the Agreement. Therefore, based
upon the evidence presented at trial on fraudulent and negligent

6

The Morses' own accountant even testified that they were not
good bookkeepers (R. at 2985).
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misrepresentation, material breach and mutual mistake, Fairfield
asks that this court reverse the trial court and

find that

Fairfield is entitled to rescission of the Agreement.
II.
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in Denying
Fairfield's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint.
On March 14> 1991, Fairfield filed a Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint, with an accompanying Memorandum.

The trial

court subsequently denied the Motion without providing any basis
for the denial. Such denial was an abuse of discretion and should
be reversed by this court.
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for
amendment of pleadings by leave of court, which "leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires."

Furthermore, Rule 15(a)

"is to be liberally construed so as to further the interests of
justice,"

particularly if an amendment is sought before trial.

Girard v. Applvbv, 660 P. 2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983).
consideration

in determining

whether

an

amendment

"A prime
should

be

permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity for the opposing party
to meet the newly raised matter."
98 (Utah 1981).

Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94,

In the case at bar, the trial court abused its

discretion in refusing to allow Fairfield to amend the Complaint.
The proposed Amended Complaint added three causes of action
for (1) imposition of a constructive trust, (2) declaration of a
fraudulent transfer, and (3) injunctive relief.

The facts under-

lying these causes of action are identical to the facts underlying
the original causes of action for misrepresentation and mutual
mistake.

A liberal construction of Rule 15(a), as required by
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Girard, suggests that the amendment should have been allowed.

In

addition, the Morses were put on notice of the proposed Amended
Complaint by the allegations already in the Complaint, including
that the Morses made fraudulent misrepresentations in order to
induce Fairfield to enter into the Agreement and to pay $20,000.00
down. Even if the additional causes of action were considered new,
the trial of this matter was not held until October 15, 1991. For
that reason, the Morses had ample opportunity to meet the "newly
raised matter," as required in Lewis.

For that reason, Fairfield

urges this court to reverse the trial court and allow the proposed
Amended Complaint.
III.
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in Denying
Fairfield's Motion to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyance.
On April 17, 1991, Fairfield brought a Motion before the trial
court with an accompanying Memorandum seeking to have the court set
aside the fraudulent conveyance by the Morses to their Trusts of
their interest in the Carwash, in the $20,000.00 down payment, and
in the promissory note in the amount of $45,000.00. Subsequently,
the trial court denied Fairfield's Motion, again without providing
to the parties any basis upon which the Motion was denied.

Such

denial was an abuse of discretion, and Fairfield urges this court
to reverse the denial of its Motion and set aside the fraudulent
transfer.
On July 10, 1985, the Morses individually sold the Carwash to
Fairfield (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.) The Warranty Deed transferring
the property was also executed by the Morses individually (Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.)

However, the All-inclusive Promissory Note and
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Trust Deed, which were prepared by American Title at the time of
closing, were made in favor of the Trusts (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8.)
The only conclusion which can be reached from this evidence is that
simultaneously with the closing, the Morses transferred their
interest in the Carwash, in the $20,000.00 down payment, and in the
promissory note, to their Trusts. No evidence was submitted to the
trial court that any consideration was ever paid for said transfer.
On February 12, 1986, the Morses filed a petition for relief in the
United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah, under Case No.
86-00598-GEC, without listing their Counterclaim in this lawsuit or
any interest in the Carwash as property of the estate.

The

transfer of their interests as stated above to their Trusts was a
fraudulent conveyance and should be set aside.
§25-6-5 of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which is
applicable

to

this

transfer, defines

fraudulent

transfer

as

follows:
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the
creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made
the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any creditor of
the debtor; or
(b) without
receiving
a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer or obligation; and the debtor:

(ii) intended to incur, or believed or
reasonably should have believed that he
would incur, debts beyond his ability to
pay as they became due.
U.C.A. §25-6-5.

Paragraph (2) of §25-6-5 provides criteria to be
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used by the court in determining actual intent under paragraph
(l)(a), including the following relevant criteria:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property
transferred after the transfer;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset
transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; and
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly
after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred.
The trial court should have found the transfer by the Morses to
their Trusts of the interests identified above to be fraudulent
pursuant to both subparagraphs (l)(a) and (b).
The Morses transferred their interest in the Carwash, the
promissory note and the $20,000.00 down payment without receiving
any consideration from the Trusts.

Based on their bankruptcy

filing only seven months after the transfer was made, the Morses
reasonably understood that they had already incurred debts beyond
their ability to pay as they became due.

Thus, the transfer was

fraudulent based upon §25-6-5(1)(b).
Application of §25-6-5(2) reveals that the Morses also made
the transfer with "actual intent" to hinder, delay, or defraud
their creditors. The criteria which apply in this situation are as
follows:
(a) The transfer was to an insider—the transfer
was to the family Trusts, with the Morses apparently
acting as Trustees, clearly an insider transfer.
(b) The debtor retained possession or control of the
property transferred after the transfer—acting as Trustees of
the family Trusts, the Morses retained total possession and
control of the interest transferred to the Trusts.
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(h) The value of the consideration received by the
debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset
transferred—clearly the Morses exhibited actual intent based
on the fact that no consideration was received by them for the
interest transferred to the Trusts.
(i) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly
after the transfer was made—the Morses insolvency at the time
of this transfer or shortly thereafter resulted in their
petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, only seven months after the
transfer was made.
Actual fraudulent intent can be inferred from the presence of
the above "badges of fraud."

Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d

420, 423 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). All of the above "badges
of fraud" are evident in the transfer by the Morses to their Trusts
of the above referenced interests. Thus, the trial court should
have also found the transfer to be fraudulent based upon §25-65(l)(a).
The Morses argued before the trial court that the Motion
should be denied because fraudulent conveyance had not been pled in
the Complaint.

However, a request to set aside a fraudulent

conveyance may be brought by motion, without the necessity of prior
pleadings concerning it. Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah
1974).

In addition, the fraudulent conveyance statute "should be

construed with liberality so as to reach all artifices and evasions
designed to rob the Act of its full force and effect in preventing
debtors from paying the just claims of their creditors." Butler v.
Wilkinson, 740 P. 2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987). In furtherance of that
policy, the trial court should have found that the Morses transfer
of their interests in the Carwash, the $20,000.00 down payment and
the $45,000.00 promissory note was fraudulent pursuant to both
sections (a) and (b) of §25-6-5(1) of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent
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Transfer Act.

For that reason, Fairfield asks that this court

reverse the trial court's denial of its Motion and set aside the
transfer as fraudulent.
IV.
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in Denying
Fairfield's Motion for Order Declaring Trusts Invalid.
On April

19, 1991, Fairfield

filed

a Motion

for Order

Declaring Trusts Invalid, with an accompanying Memorandum.

The

trial court subsequently denied the Motion without providing any
basis for the denial.

Such denial was an abuse of discretion and

should be reversed by this court.
On or about January 15, 1984, the Morses as Settlors and
Scott Buehler as Trustee executed Trust Agreements entitled Dianne
L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust and Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable
Family Trust, copies of which were admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibits
36

and

37.

individually

Although

the

Carwash

was

sold

by

the Morses

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 5, 9-11), the All-inclusive

Promissory Note and Trust Deed were in favor of the Trusts
(Plaintiff's

Exhibit

8).

Since

the Morses

had

represented

themselves as Trustees on the All-inclusive Promissory Note,
Fairfield named the Morses both individually and as Trustees when
the Complaint was filed on October 31, 1985. On December 11, 1985,
the Morses answered the Complaint and filed a Counterclaim, both
individually and as Trustees of the Trusts, in spite of the fact
that Mr. Buehler was Trustee at the time.

On February 10, 1986,

Mr. Buehler resigned as Trustee of both Trusts.

(Deposition of J.

Scott Buehler, pp. 16-17, found in the Addendum to this Brief.)
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Although the Trusts named Brent A. Dopp as successor trustee,
Mr. Dopp had absolutely no knowledge concerning the Trusts or this
lawsuit at the time Fairfield brought its motion to have the Trusts
declared invalid on April 19, 1991. (Deposition of Brent Dopp, pp.
4-5, 8-10, found in the Addendum to this Brief.)

Pursuant to

Fairfield's Motion, the trial court should have declared the Trusts
invalid, the effect of which would have been to make the Morses'
Bankruptcy Trustee, David Gladwell, the true party in interest in
this action.
In the clear and well reasoned opinion in Continental Bank v.
Country Club Mobile Est., 632 P.2d 869 (Utah 1981), former Justice
Oaks of the Utah Supreme Court definitively stated the law in Utah
on Trusts and a settlor's power over trust property after creation
of a trust.

Justice Oaks' knowledge on trusts, as a former

professor of trust law at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University, adds additional weight to his opinion.
In

Continental

Bank, the

settlor

conveyed

certain

real

property to a trustee in trust for various members of his family.
However, in contravention of the trust agreement, the settlor later
granted a third, party, who was leasing the real property, an
extension on a previously granted option to buy.

The trustee

brought an action against the optionee to quiet title to the
property, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment on
the issue of the validity of the extension.

The District Court

granted the optionee's motion, but the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that:
If we gave legal effect to the settlor's extension of
this option in contravention of the existence and terms
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of the trust, we would prejudice the interests of the
beneficiaries, blur some fundamental principals of trust
law, and cast doubt upon whether it is the trustee or the
settlor who is empowered to manage and dispose of the
trust property in a valid revocable trust.
Id. at 872.

Although the facts in Continental Bank are not

identical with those on appeal before this court, the law in Utah
on Trusts, as concisely stated by Justice Oaks in his opinion, is
most helpful in the court's determination of this issue.
When the Morses executed the Trust Agreements on January 15,
1984, they created entities apart from themselves which were
capable of property ownership.

From that date forward, any

properties vested in the Trusts would have to be transferred to Mr.
Buehler or his successor, as Trustee.
Buehler resigned

However, even before Mr.

as Trustee of the Trusts, the Morses have

attempted to transfer their interests in the promissory note to
themselves as Trustees of their Trusts.

They also represented

themselves as Trustees of the Trusts to their original counsel and
to the trial court in filing an Answer and Counterclaim in this
action, all before Mr. Buehler's resignation.

This is a flagrant

violation of trust law as explained by Justice Oaks in this way:
A trust is a form of ownership in which the legal
title to property is vested in a trustee, who has
equitable duties to hold and manage it for the benefit of
the beneficiaries. It is therefore axiomatic in trust
law that the trustee under a valid trust deed has
exclusive control of the trust property, subject only to
the limitations imposed by law or the trust instrument,
and that once the settlor has created the trust he is no
longer the owner of the trust property and has only such
ability to deal with it as is expressly reserved to him
in the trust instrument. . . . After a settlor has
completed the creation of a trust he . . .has no
liabilities or powers with regard to the trust
administration.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The Trust Agreements, which were admitted before the trial
court as Plaintiff's Exhibits 36 and 37, state in Article II:
This Trust cannot be altered, amended, revoked or
terminated by the Settlor, and the Settlor retains no
beneficial interest vested or contingent hereunder.
The Trust Agreements granted all power of their administration to
the Trustee.

However, in contravention of this provision, the

Morses commandeered the administration of these Trusts long before
Mr. Buehler's resignation and, no doubt, even from inception. This
course of conduct has included transfer of their interest in the
promissory note to themselves as Trustees, hiring counsel on behalf
of the Trusts to defend this action, bringing a Counterclaim in
this action, and continuing to represent the Trusts in this action,
even

after

being

dismissed

individually.

Based

upon

the

depositions of Mr. Buehler and Dr. Dopp, it is clear that neither
of them, as proper trustees, ever administered the Trusts.
It should be clear from the evidence before the trial court
that the Morses have perpetuated a colossal fraud not only upon
Fairfield, but also upon the proper Trustees of the Trusts, upon
their counsel, and upon the trial court.

In addition, it is also

clear that neither the promissory note, nor any other property for
that matter, was ever delivered to either of the proper Trustees of
the Trusts.

Creation of a trust clearly requires delivery of

property into the trust.
(Utah 1985).

Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 759

The Morses' failure to ever deliver any property

into their Trusts is also sufficient grounds to declare the Trusts
invalid.
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All the evidence before the trial court made it clear that the
Trust Agreements executed by the Morses were never more than a sham
and should have been disregarded.

"[I]f the settlor reserves a

substantial interest or unbridled control over management of the
operations,

. . . the trust may be found to be a illusory.

Subsequently, the settlor remains the owner of the property and
there is no beneficiary."

Roberts v. So. Oklahoma City Hosp.

Trust, 742 P.2d 1077, 1083 (Okla. 1986).

Since the Trusts at

issue were only illusory and not real entities, the interest in the
promissory note proportedly transferred to the Trusts was always
the property of the Morses individually and therefore falls under
the

jurisdiction

proceeding.

of

the

Trustee

in

the

Morses'

bankruptcy

As a result, the Trusts should be declared by this

court to be invalid and the Bankruptcy Trustee reinstated as the
real party in interest in this lawsuit.
V.
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in Denying
Fairfield's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Seeking
Dismissal of the Counterclaim as to Fairfield by the
Doctrine of Election of Remedies.
On April 30, 1991, Fairfield brought a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment before the trial court, seeking to have the
Morses' Counterclaim dismissed as to Fairfield by application of
the doctrine of election of remedies.

Subsequently, the trial

court denied Fairfield's Motion without providing the parties a
basis for the denial.

The trial court should have granted the

Motion and dismissed the Counterclaim as to Fairfield, based upon
the doctrine of election of remedies.
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The general rule has been stated to be that where a
party has grounds to bring different actions arising out
of the same state of facts against different persons, and
the maintenance of one action necessitates the allegation
of a fact inconsistent with the maintenance of another,
he is bound by his election, and cannot proceed against
the other person.
Annotation, Doctrine of election of remedies as applicable where
remedies are pursued against different persons, 16 A.L.R. 601, 607
(citations omitted).
When a party has a cause of action against different entities,
and he alleges a fact or assumes a position in one cause of action
against one party which is inconsistent with or is repugnant to a
fact or position that is necessary to the other cause of action,
the party must elect which cause of action he will pursue. Autocar
Sales & Service Co. v. Holscher, 11 S.W.2d 1072, 1074 (Mo. Ct. App.
1928).

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this doctrine,

stating that the "doctrine of election of remedies applies as a bar
only where the two actions are inconsistent, generally based upon
incompatible facts; ..." Farmers & Merch. Bank v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 289 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Utah 1955).

The doctrine of

election of remedies should have been applied by the trial court in
granting Fairfield's Motion, due to the inconsistent positions
which the Morses have taken concerning their claims against Fairfield and against Durbano and Garn individually.
The inconsistency became obvious when, on August 17, 1990,
Durbano and Garn moved the trial court for summary judgment,
seeking dismissal of them individually from the action.
response to that motion, the Morses filed Affidavit's with the
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In

court (R. at 725-29, 736-40), in which the Morses swear to the
following:
(a) During negotiations for the sale of the Carwash, the
Morses dealt solely with Durbano and Garn.
(b) DurbanO and Garn represented to the Morses that they were
purchasing the Carwash as individuals.
(c) The Morses were never made aware of the existence of any
separate business entity independent of Durbano and Garn at
any time during the negotiations for the sale of the Carwash.
(d) At the closing of the Carwash sale, the sale documents
which were prepared by Durbano and Garn set forth the name
American Vending Services, Inc., as the purchaser.
(e) The Morses immediately inquired of Durbano and Garn
regarding the inclusion of American Vending Services, Inc., as
the purchaser.
(f) Durbano and Garn indicated to the Morses that they wanted
the Carwash to be in the name of American Vending Services,
Inc., that American Vending Services, Inc., was a business
name used by Durbano and Garn, and that American Vending
Services, Inc., was not a separate corporate entity. Durbano
and Garn further assured the Morses that the Carwash was being
sold to Durbano and Garn who were just using the name of
American Vending Services, Inc., to do business.
(g) At all times prior to and subsequent to the closing, the
Morses believed that they were dealing with Durbano and Garn
as individual purchasers of the Carwash.
The Morses have sworn in their Affidavits that, from beginning
to end, as

far as

they knew, they were

only dealing with

individuals in the sale of the Carwash, and not with any corporate
entity.

Clearly this position is repugnant and contradictory to

any claim the Morses may have against Fairfield as alleged in their
Counterclaim.

Thus, pursuant to Autocar Sales, the Morses have

made their election and their Counterclaim

should have been

dismissed as to Fairfield.
The Utah Supreme Court also discussed the doctrine in Royal
Resources v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979), in
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which the parties entered into a stipulation that the plaintiff
could take judgment against the corporate dependant and, in the
event of no recovery, then proceed against the individual defendants. The Court found the stipulation to be at variance with, and
refused to invoke, the doctrine of election of remedies, stating:
It is noteworthy that, except for the stipulation, had
plaintiff chosen to take judgment against [the corporate
defendant], such may well have been viewed as an election
of remedies, and if properly raised as a defense, it
would have obviated the necessity of trial and this
appeal.
Id. at 796.

Based upon the Morses' election to pursue Fairfield,

and pursuant to Royal Resources, the trial court should have
dismissed Fairfield by application of the doctrine of election of
remedies.
The Morses' sworn statements in their Affidavits are binding
and

cannot

subsequently

be

contradicted

by

other

factual

allegations. Premier Elec. Const, v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 477 N.E.2d
1249, 1256 (111. Ct. App. 1984).

In order to maintain their

Counterclaim against Fairfield, the Morses must now allege that the
corporation was validly
Agreement

and

existing

promissory

note.

and did
This

indeed
fact

execute the

is

completely

incompatible to the facts referenced above to which the Morses have
previously sworn.

Thus, based on Farmers & Merc. Bank, the

existence of incompatible facts requires that the Morses elect
their remedy. Based upon the Morses' Affidavits, they have elected
their action and now may only pursue the individuals.

For that

reason, Fairfield asks that this court reverse the trial court's
denial of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and find that,
prior to trial, the Counterclaim should have been dismissed as to
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Fairfield.

Thus, when Fairfield's existence was proven at trial,

the Morses' Counterclaim

should

have been

dismissed

in its

entirety.
VI.
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in Dismissing
the Morses' Bankruptcy Trustee, David Gladwell, From This
Action.
On November 19, 1990, Fairfield, Durbano and Garn filed a
Motion in the trial court for Leave to Join the Morses' Bankruptcy
Trustee, David L. Gladwell, as a Defendant/Counterclaimant in this
action.

On January 15, 1991, the trial court granted the Motion.

However, on July 30, 1991, the trial court reversed its decision
and dismissed Mr. Gladwell from the action. Such dismissal was an
abuse of discretion, in that Mr. Gladwell should be the real party
in interest in this action.
The Motion to join Mr. Gladwell was brought pursuant to Rule
19(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a
party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave
any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the
court shall order that he be made a party.
In this action, Mr. Gladwell, as Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee
in Bankruptcy No. 86C-00598, reopened the Morses' Bankruptcy on
April 23, 1989, in order to pursue any assets that could be brought
into the estate as a result of litigating this action.
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Since Mr.

Gladwell is located in Ogden, he is subject to service of process
of the court and would not deprive the court of subject matter
jurisdiction nor render the venue improper.

In addition, as

Trustee of the Morses' Bankruptcy, he did claim an interest in the
outcome of this action and his ability to protect that interest
would have been impaired or impeded if he were not joined as a
party.

Therefore, pursuant to Rule 19 (a), he was a proper party

and was properly joined by the court in its original grant of the
Motion.
The trial court later dismissed Mr. Gladwell from the action,
based on its ruling that he would be precluded from filing a
fraudulent conveyance action. The dismissal of Mr. Gladwell was in
conjunction with the trial court's denial of Fairfield's Motions
(1) seeking an order that the Trusts were invalid, (2) to set aside
the fraudulent conveyance, and (3) to amend the Complaint to add a
cause of action for fraudulent transfer.

Had the trial court

granted any one of these other three Motions, the trial court
should have also granted the Motion to add Mr. Gladwell, as he
would be the only real party in interest. Thus, should this court
reverse the trial court's decision on any of the other three
Motions, such action would also support reversal of this Motion to
add Mr. Gladwell, and this court should find that he is the real
party in interest and the only Defendant/Counterclaimant.
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ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF
VII.
The Doctrine of De Facto Corporation was Not Abolished by
the Utah Business Corporation Act and was Properly
Applied by the Court Below.
The Morses argue in their opening Brief that the common law
doctrine of de facto corporation was abolished by the Utah Business
Corporation Act, which was enacted in 1961.

The Morses cite the

Model Business Corporation Act7 in support of this proposition, and
their Brief relies heavily upon an Oregon case, Timberline Equipment Co. Inc. v. Davenport, 514 P. 2d 1109 (Or. 1973), in an effort
to convince this court to follow suit.

What the Morses fail to

advise this court is that the Oregon statute governing this issue
is significantly different from the Utah statute.
In Timberline8, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Oregon
Business Corporation Act precluded the common law doctrine of de
facto corporation.

However, the Court was construing ORS 57.793,

which states:
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without
the authority of a certificate of incorporation issued by
the Corporation Commissioner, shall be jointly and
severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred
or arising as a result thereof.
ORS 57.793 (emphasis added). In comparison, §16-10-139 of the Utah
Business Corporation Act states:

7

See discussion of the Model Act and its influence on the
doctrines of de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel on
pp. 55-57 of this Brief.
8

The Oregon Supreme Court in Timberline found the Utah
Supreme Court's opinion in Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah State Tax
Comm., 407 P.2d 683 (Utah 1965) unpersuasive. In like manner, this
court may find the opinion of Timberline equally unpersuasive.
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All persons who assume to act as a corporation
without authority so to do shall be jointly and severally
liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or arising
as a result thereof.
U.C.A. §16-10-139 (emphasis added).
The distinction between the statutes could not be clearer.
Obviously, the Oregon legislature fully intended to abolish the
doctrine of de facto corporation in Oregon through the enactment of
its statute.

However, on the contrary, the Utah legislature

enacted §16-10-139 without any specific language referring to a
certificate of incorporation.

Thus, the Utah statute can be read

to allow persons to act as a corporation if authorized to do so by
the doctrine of de facto corporation.

In like manner, U.C.A. §16-

10-519, the other statute cited by the Morses, can be read to mean
that the de jure existence of a corporation commences upon issuance
of a certificate of incorporation, which does not preclude a
corporation from existing de facto prior to that time.
This is precisely the interpretation given to §16-10-51 by the
Utah Supreme Court in Vincent Drug Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 407
P.2d

683 (Utah 1965).

In Vincent Drug, the Court stated as

follows:
Although, under the provisions of Sec. 16-10-51,
U.C.A.1953, a corporation begins to exist upon the
issuance of the certificate of incorporation, and such
charter is conclusive evidence that all conditions
precedent have been complied with, it does not follow
that a corporation cannot exist before such issuance of
a certificate of incorporation.
Where a bona fide
attempt to organize a corporation under a valid law has
been made, and the incorporators have done business as
such a corporation, and but for some unintentional formal
9

§16-10-51 states in relevant part: "upon issuance of the
certificate of incorporation, the corporate existence shall
begin,..."
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defect there would be a de jure existence, the
association is a de facto corporation and its existence
as a corporation cannot as a rule be inquired into
collaterally.
Id. at 684 (footnote omitted).

Thus, Utah law recognizes the

doctrine of de facto corporation, and the trial court properly
applied the doctrine in this action.
The

Morses

have

misstated

the

facts

of

Vincent

Drug,

stretching the opinion in that case to include a requirement that
Articles of Incorporation be filed before a de facto corporation
can be found.

A close examination of Vincent Drug reveals that

there is no such requirement under Utah law. The undisputed facts
in Vincent Drug were clearly stated by the Court as follows:
(1) Articles of Incorporation were filed on January 2,
1962.
(2) After that date, Vincent Drug Company conducted business
as a corporation.
(3) Before becoming aware of the defect in the Articles,
Vincent Drug Company had elected to conduct its business
on a fiscal year ending March 31.
(4) Presumably within a few days after January 2, 1962, the
Articles were returned to the corporation's counsel for
failure to include street addresses of the incorporators
and directors.
(5) Tax returns were filed for the first quarter of 1962,
presumiably sometime in mid April, 1962.
(6) Corrected Articles were filed shortly before May 21,
1962, on which date the Secretary of State recorded the
Articles of Incorporation.
Id. at 683-84.
It is clear from the above stated facts that Vincent Drug
Company was well aware in April, 1962, at the time of filing its
initial tax return, that the Articles of Incorporation had been
returned. That knowledge would have been either direct or imputed
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to Vincent Drug Company from receipt of the defective Articles by
the corporation's counsel. IdL at 683.

With that knowledge, the

tax return was filed, and it wasn't until May, 1962, that proper
Articles were filed. In Vincent Drug, the Utah Supreme Court found
that (1) a bona fide attempt to organize a corporation had been
made, (2) the incorporators had done business as the corporation,
and (3) there was an unintentional formal defect that prevented de
jure existence, and the Court ruled that Vincent Drug Company was
a de facto corporation.

Id., at 684.

The facts underlying the opinion in Vincent Drug are almost
identical to the facts in the case at bar.

It is undisputed that

prior to July of 1985, counsel for Fairfield filed Articles of
Incorporation under two different names, American Food Services,
Inc. and American Food and Vending Services, Inc.

However, prior

to July 10, 1985, both filings were returned because of name
conflicts. Also prior to July 10, 1985, Articles of Incorporation
using an approved name were drafted but were not executed until
August 1, 1985 and not filed until August 19, 1985.

The primary

reason that the Articles were not filed prior to July 10, 1985, was
because the corporation's counsel was moving his office and was
busy and distracted.

Notwithstanding knowledge that the Articles

formerly filed had been returned, Fairfield executed the Agreement,
promissory note and trust deed on July 10, 1985.

These facts are

as nearly identical to the facts of Vincent Drug as two cases can
be.

For that reason, this court should affirm the trial court's

finding that Fairfield also made a bona fide attempt to organize a
corporation prior to July 10, 1985.
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The

other

two

elements, identified

in Vincent

Drug as

prerequisites to the finding of de facto corporation, are also
satisfied in the case at bar.

The second element is that the

incorporators have done business as a corporation.

The evidence

at trial established that the incorporators executed documents on
the purchase of the Carwash in the name of the corporation, opened
a corporate bank account, hired a manager, and began holding
corporate meetings, all before the corporation existed de. jure on
August 19, 1985. After that date, the incorporators continued to
conduct the business as a corporation, including holding the
organizational and other corporate meetings, having discussions
with Mr. Morse concerning the problems with the Carwash, and
filing this lawsuit.

These facts establish definitively that the

incorporators did business as a corporation, satisfying the second
element of Vincent Drug.
The third element to be satisfied is that but for some
unintentional formal defect, there would be de jure existence. The
Morses argue in their Brief that this element is not satisfied
because the Articles of Incorporation that were filed on August 19,
1992, contained no defect.

However, this is not the defect

involved, nor was it the defect in Vincent Drug.

The defect in

both cases was that Articles had been filed and returned, and
corrected Articles had not been filed prior to doing the act upon
which the corporate existence was challenged.

Thus, it is clear

that all three elements are satisfied in the case at bar and,
pursuant

to

Vincent

Drug,

this

court

should

corporation's de facto existence on July 10, 1985.
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affirm

the

The Morses argue that to apply Vincent Drug in affirming the
trial court's ruling of de facto corporation would allow parties to
simply use "inc." on any contract signed and later claim that they
intended to file Articles of Incorporation but simply were too busy
to do so. This argument misses the whole basis of the doctrine of
de facto corporation.

In the absence of evidence of good faith

efforts to incorporate prior to signing a document, the doctrine of
de facto corporation is not available.

Thus, the Morses' concern

over a huge loop hole in the Corporation Act by application of the
doctrine of de facto corporation is misplaced.
Fairfield

prior

to

July

10, 1985, in

The two filings by

combination

with

the

establishment of de jure existence on August 19, 1985, firmly
support the trial court's finding of de facto corporation.
The Morses cite many cases in their Brief dealing with
situations where no Articles of Incorporation had ever been filed
prior to the act upon which the corporate existence is challenged.
None of these cases are persuasive, due to the two good faith
filings by Fairfield, which were rejected prior to July 10, 1985.
The Morses also state in their Brief that these two prior filings
were for a partnership as opposed to the corporation.

However,

this allegation is not supported by the evidence. Durbano and Garn
both testified that the partnership and the corporation were always
separate entities, and that the two prior rejections resulted from
efforts to form a corporation to purchase the Carwash. Thus, this
argument is also not persuasive.

For that reason, this court

should affirm the trial court's finding of de facto corporation on
the closing date of July 10, 1985.
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The Morses

further

argue

in

their

Brief

that

until a

certificate of incorporation is issued, an individual who signs on
behalf of a corporation is personally liable, citing Gillham
Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d

163 (Utah 1977).

However, the Morses' emphasis on Gillham is misplaced.

In that

case, there was no corporation de, jure, de facto, or by estoppel.
Id. at 166.

Obviously, an individual who signs on behalf of a

totally non-existent corporation is personally liable, pursuant to
U.C.A. §16-10-139. However, Gillham is not persuasive in the case
at bar, due to the fact that Fairfield existed de facto and by
estoppel on July 10, 1985, and de jure on August 19, 1985. For all
the reasons stated above, this court should affirm the trial
court's finding of de facto corporation.
VIII.
The Trial Court Properly Found Fairfield to be a
Corporation by Estoppel, Which Doctrine was also Not
Abolished by the Utah Business Corporation Act.
The Morses argue in their Brief that the Model Act also
abolished the doctrine of corporation by estoppel, citing in
particular Robertson v. L e w , 197 A. 2d 443 (D.C. 1964).

However,

the Morses have failed to disclose to this court that the same
appellate panel from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
which held that corporation by estoppel was no longer viable under
their corporation act in Robertson, two years later held that a
party was estopped to deny the existence of a corporation in
Namerdv v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 112 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966).

It

is also interesting to note that the Oregon case upon which the
Morses rely so heavily on the issue of de facto corporation has
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dropped out of their argument. This is because the Oregon Supreme
Court recognized

the doctrine of corporation by estoppel in

Timberline, supra, 514 P. 2d at 1112.
The Morses also cite an Arizona case in support of this issue,
Booker Custom Packing Co. Inc. v. Sallomi, 716 P.2d 1061 (Ariz. Ct.
App.

1986).

However, in Booker, the court did not address

corporation by estoppel, but found that the defendant's request for
non-liability was inconsistent with A.R.S. §10-146, a statute
similar to U.C.A. §16-10-139. id. at 1063. This does not preclude
the Arizona courts from invoking the doctrine of corporation by
estoppel, just as the court's in Oregon and the District of
Columbia have done. In like manner, the Colorado case cited by the
Morses, Bowers Bldg. Co. v. Altura Glass Co., Inc., 694 P.2d 876
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984), did not specifically address the doctrine of
corporation by estoppel. Indeed, the Arizona Court of Appeals has
recently upheld the doctrine of corporation by estoppel in Spurlock
v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 694 P.2d 299, 314 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984), cert. denied 472 U.S. 1032 (1985), as has the Court of
Appeals of Colorado in Graham, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel
Co., 680 P.2d 1334, 1335-36 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
The Morses make a statement in their Brief that no Utah case
has ever recognized the doctrine of corporation by estoppel.
Although many points of law have never reached the appellate level
in the State of Utah, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized this
doctrine in Nielson v. Smith, 107 P.2d 158 (Utah 1940).

In that

case, Nielson's predecessor, Charles D. Moore, had acquired the
right to receive payments on a real estate contract, which payments
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were originally made by John W. Smith.

However, after Mr. Smith

transferred his interest in the real property to Smith Land
Company, a Utah corporation, the corporation made the payments, and
Mr. Moore looked to the corporation for the payments.
When the trial court pierced the corporate veil, Smith argued
on appeal that Nielson was estopped to question the corporate
existence, based upon the fact that his predecessor, Mr. Moore,
recognized, dealt with and accepted payments from the corporation.
Although

the Utah Supreme Court recognized

this doctrine of

corporation by estoppel, the Court held that "[i]t cannot be said,
therefore, that acceptance of payments by Moore from the Land
Company bound his successors to a recognition of the legality and
regularity of organization of the corporation."

3x1. at 162.10

Thus, this doctrine is recognized in Utah, contrary to the Morses'
assertion in their Brief.
The Morses argue that, even if the doctrine of corporation by
estoppel is recognized by the court, it is not available to Durbano
and Garn, based primarily upon an analysis found in the Model
Business

Corporation

Act.11

Although

this

analysis

may

be

comprehensive, it is certainly not objective. Under the Model Act,
anything

short of a de

jure corporation

is not recognized.

10

Implied in the Court's holding is that the predecessor
Moore, who looked to the corporation for payment on the obligation,
would thereby be estopped from denying the corporate existence. In
like manner, the Morses should also be estopped from denying
Fairfield's corporate existence, since they looked to Fairfield for
payment on the promissory note (R. at 2874).
11

See discussion of the Model Act and its influence on the
doctrines of de. facto corporation and corporation by estoppel on
pp. 55-57 of this Brief.
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However, a review of case law on the issue of corporation by
estoppel

reveals

that

the

trial

court

correctly

ruled

that

Fairfield was a corporation by estoppel.
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel is not a new one. On
the contrary, it is well established in the case law of many
jurisdictions, including Utah. Jackson v. Crown Point Min. Co., 59
P. 238, 240 (Utah 1899); Santaauin Min. Co. v. High Roller Min.
Co., 71 P. 77, 80 (Utah 1903).

In an often cited case, the Supreme

Court of Alabama stated:
[Iincidents of corporate existence may exist as between
the parties by virtue of an estoppel....Thus, besides
corporations de jure and de facto, there can be a
recognition of a third class known as "Corporations by
estoppel.". . ., the only effect of an estoppel being to
prevent the raising of the question of the existence of
a corporation.
Bukacek v. Pell City Farms, Inc., 237 So.2d 851, 853 (Ala. 1970).
The Supreme Court of Alaska has declared that "'Corporation by
estoppel' is actually a misnomer for the result of applying the
policy

whereby

private

litigants

may,

by

their

agreements,

admissions, or conduct, place themselves in a position where they
will not be permitted to deny the fact of the existence of a
corporation."
1976).

Willis v. City of Valdez, 546 P.2d 570, 574 (Alaska

Because of the fundamental legal principles which make up

the framework of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel and its
effectual purpose, it is "undoubtedly well founded in the law."
Brandtien & Kluge, Inc. v. Biggs, 288 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Or. 1955)
(citation omitted).
"Corporations

by

estoppel

are not

principles as corporations de facto."
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based

upon

the

same

Bukacek, 237 So.2d at 853;

Rogers v. Toccoa Power Co., 131 S.E. 517, 521
"Estoppel
. . ."

may

JEd.

(Ga. 1926).

prevail where there is no color of incorporation
See also, Cranson v. IBM, 200 A.2d 33, 39 (Md. Ct.

App. 1964).

Thus, the finding of corporation de facto is not a

prerequisite

to

a

finding

of

corporation

by

estoppel.

"A

'corporation by estoppel'. . .can arise only from actions and
conduct of parties which place them in such a position that they
[will] not be permitted to deny the existence of the corporation."
Childs v. Philpot, 487 S.W.2d 637, 640-41 (Ark. 1972) (citation
omitted).

While a corporation as a legal entity may not actually

be created by estoppel, under certain circumstances, an organization not necessarily de jure or de facto may, so far as the parties
to the transaction are concerned, be for all practical intents and
purposes regarded as a corporation.
Since corporation by estoppel is based upon equity principles,
no hard and fast mechanical test has been developed to rule when a
corporation by estoppel exists. However, the courts have fashioned
two solid criteria, supported by dictates of justice and equity,
which, if either is met, support such a ruling. The first of these
is that a person or entity who contracts with a corporation as such
is estopped to deny its corporate existence.

18A Am. Jur. 2d

Corporations §262; Lettinga v. Agristor Credit Corp., 686 F.2d 442,
446 (6th Cir. 1982); and Chick v. Tomlinson, 531 P.2d 573, 576
(Idaho 1975).

The second criteria is that where a defendant, sued

by a plaintiff representing itself to be a corporation, either
admits the plaintiff's corporate existence in his answer or files
a counterclaim in the action, the defendant is estopped from
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denying plaintiff's corporate existence. 18A Am. Jur. 2d Corporations §272.

Since the evidence at trial in this case established

that both criteria were clearly met, based upon equity considerations, fundamental contract principles, and the intentions of the
parties, Fairfield is a corporation by estoppel and the Morses are
estopped from denying its corporate existence.
A.

The Morses are estopped from denying the corporate

existence of Fairfield by execution of the sales documents.
One of the majority of jurisdictions supporting this principle
is the State of Oregon. In Brandtien, 288 P.2d at 1025, the Oregon
Supreme Court addressed an action brought by the seller of a
printing press against the purchaser for breach of contract.
Throughout the transaction, the plaintiff had represented itself as
a

corporation,

transaction.

as

evidenced

by

the

documentation

As a defense, the defendant

claimed

of

the

that the

plaintiff was not a corporation, and thus, the contract was void.
The Oregon Supreme Court, citing Fletcher on Corporations, stated
"a person who contracts or otherwise deals with a body of men as a
corporation thereby admits that they are a corporation, and is
estopped to deny their incorporation, in an action against him
based upon or arising out of such contract or course of dealing."
Id. at 1028 (citation omitted).
As applied to the instant case, the holding in Brandtien
supports the trial court's finding that the Morses are estopped
from denying the corporate existence of Fairfield.
Gam

testified

consistently

that they always

Durbano and

intended

to do

business as a corporation and that they communicated that intent to
the Morses, even soliciting their advice concerning the limitation
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of liability on the Carwash operation (R. at 2869). Even Mr. Morse
testified that he was never told by anyone but only speculated that
Durbano and G a m were purchasing the Carwash individually (R. at
2868).

Mr. Morse also testified that he conveyed the Carwash to

Fairfield and that there were no sale documents under any other
name (R. at 2875-76), which is supported by all of the documentary
evidence as well.

Based

upon all the contractual

evidence

submitted at trial, this court should affirm the trial court's
finding that the Morses are estopped from denying the corporate
existence of Fairfield.
This conclusion is also supported by Bukacek, supra, 237 So.
2d at 851, in which the plaintiff dealt with the defendant as a
corporation and voluntarily executed a deed transferring property
to the corporation
Incorporation.

prior to the

filing

of

its Articles of

When the plaintiff filed a quiet title action

seeking to have the conveyance set aside, the Supreme Court of
Alabama held that the plaintiff was precluded from denying the
corporate existence, stating:
[I]nsofar as the transaction here is concerned, it should
be regarded practically as a corporation, being
recognized as such by the parties themselves. In other
words, the incidents of corporate existence may exist as
between the parties by virtue of an estoppel. . .

. . .[A]s between themselves and in connection with their
own private litigations as here involved they may, by
their agreements or their conduct estop themselves from
denying the fact of the existence of the corporation.
Id. at 853.
Bukacek is directly applicable to the present case.
evidence

presented

at

trial

established
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that

Articles

The
of

Incorporation were submitted prior to the closing on the Carwash
but were rejected for unavailable names.

Although the final

Articles had been prepared at the time of the closing on July 10,
1985, they were not actually filed until August 19, 1985. However,
since the Morses executed the sale documents with Fairfield as a
corporation12, they are now estopped from denying the corporate
existence.

See also, Cranson, 200 A.2d at 34 (the doctrine of

corporation by estoppel should be "generally employed where the
person seeking to hold the officer personally liable has contracted
or otherwise dealt with the association in such a manner as to
recognize and in effect admit its existence as a corporate body");
Namerdv. 217 A. 2d at 112 (the defendant was estopped to deny the
plaintiff's corporate status by execution of agreement stating that
the plaintiff was a corporation).

Based on the evidence admitted

at trial and the general case law, this court should affirm the
trial court's finding of corporation by estoppel, precluding the
Morses from now denying the corporate existence of Fairfield.
B.
The Morses are also estopped from denying the corporate
existence of Fairfield by their Answer and Counterclaim.
The second criteria which court's have used to preclude
denials of corporate existence is based on the intentions of the
parties as evidenced by their pleadings. For example, in Brandtien
discussed

above, in answering the plaintiff's

complaint, the

defendant included a counterclaim against the plaintiff as a
corporation.

Based upon the pleadings, the Oregon Supreme Court

12

Mr. Morse also testified that he understands the concept of
corporations and the limitation of liability of shareholders of a
corporation (R. at 2863-64).
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found

that the defendant

had admitted

the existence of the

plaintiff as a corporation and was estopped from any later attempt
to deny such existence, stating:
[W]e express the belief that it is well established that
. . . a defendant who is sued by a business unit which
alleges its existence as a corporation and who includes
in his answer a counterclaim, cannot, upon the trial,
refute the averment concerning the plaintiff's corporate
existence.
Brandtien, 288 P.2d. at 1029.13
Brandtien is also directly applicable to the instant case.
This action was brought against the Morses by Fairfield, alleging
its corporate existence. In answering the Complaint, not only did
the Morses admit the allegation of Fairfield's corporate existence,
but the Morses also brought a Counterclaim against Fairfield for
breach of the promissory note. In addition, the Morses subsequently served a Notice of Default upon Durbano as registered agent of
Fairfield.

By such actions, the Morses are estopped by the record

from denying Fairfield's corporate existence.

Based upon that

estoppel, the Morses have no claim against Durbano and Garn
individually, since their actions were only as representatives of
the corporation.
In their Brief, the Morses concede that in their Answer and
Counterclaim

they

have

admitted

the

corporate

existence

of

Fairfield, but that they haven't admitted the corporate existence
at the time of closing.

However, this is splitting hairs.

The

case law cited above is clear that a party who admits the corporate
existence in an answer or counterclaim is estopped from denying the
13

See also, Spurlock, 694 P.2d at 314; Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d

1449.
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corporate existence.

In addition, the fact that all documentation

created at the time of closing named Fairfield as the purchaser of
the Carwash is an admission on the part of the Morses that the
corporation did exist at the time of closing. To allow the Morses
to contract with the corporation and then deny its existence at the
time of closing would "accomplish an unjust and inequitable result
in

favor

of

expectations."

plaintiffs

contrary

to

their

own

contractual

Cantor v. Sunshine Greenery, Inc., 398 A.2d 571,

573 (N.J. Ct. App. 1979). Thus, this court should affirm the trial
court's finding that Fairfield was a corporation by estoppel at the
time of closing.
In addition to being contrary to well settled law, allowing
the Morses to maintain an action against Durbano and Garn would set
a precedent that would inevitably and undesirably slow the wheels
of commerce.

By allowing parties to enter contracts, and then

later, to directly contradict their express intentions as evidenced
by their contract documents, the court would
contractual

breaches.

Any

encouragement

obviously contrary to public policy.

of

be encouraging
this

nature

is

Rather, this court should

honor the parties' right to contract and acknowledge the bargains
the parties make according to their evidenced intentions.

Any

judgment which usurps the clear intentions of the parties works an
injustice, undermines freedom of contract, and is contrary to the
policies of equity and justice upon which the courts are founded.
The Morses' final argument that corporation by estoppel was
improperly found by the trial court, because Durbano and Garn
ignored the corporate existence, is contrary to the evidence at
52

trial.14

Although the formal organizational meeting was not held

until January 1, 1986, corporate meetings were held regularly
throughout 1985, some of which Mr. Morse was asked to attend.
Also, although the actual checks written to purchase the Carwash
were from the account of Durbano and Garn's partnership, American
Food Services, that was done only to save the expense of setting up
a new checking account for the corporation until the purchase of
the Carwash was assured, and the funds in the amount of $20,000.00,
as down payment for the Carwash, were contributed by Durbano and
Garn personally to the corporation which, in turn, purchased the
Carwash (R. at 2463-64, 2551-57, 2608-09, 2656-59, 2665).
In preparing tax and accounting documents, the accountant for
both the partnership and the corporation did not know what entity
had purchased the Carwash but exercised independent discretion in
his work, to maximize the tax benefits to Durbano and Garn, who
intended to own the corporation under an S election, the tax
consequences of which would have been the same if they had owned
the Carwash as a partnership (R. at 2464-66, 2520-21, 2532-33,
2648-51, 2726-27, 2729, 2732-33, 2742-44). And finally, when shortfalls occurred, which they regularly did, in the corporate checking

14

Although the trial judge is in the best position to properly
assess the credibility of the witnesses on this issue, the Morses'
lack of credibility, which is quite evident on the record, is no
doubt why the trial judge essentially disregarded their testimony.
Not only was their testimony often contradictory to their prior
depositions (R. at 2901-06, 2974-75), but their testimony at trial
was also often controverted by the testimony of non-party witnesses
(R. at 2880, 2892, 2894, 2985, 3001-06, 3033-34; Affidavit of
Michelle Kirchhefer found in the Addendum to this Brief).
In
contrast, the testimony of Durbano and Garn was never questioned at
trial by use of their prior depositions and was consistently in
harmony with the testimony of all witnesses except the Morses.
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account, money was transferred to it from the partnership checking
account, but the funds came from the individuals in their capacity
as shareholders of the corporation (R. at 2408, 2664, 2691-92,
2696-97).

Thus, Durbano and Garn never ignored the corporate

existence and always treated the Carwash as a corporate asset. In
weighing the equities of this case, this court should affirm the
trial court's finding of no individual liability on the part of
Durbano and Garn.
In Summary, the Morses should be precluded from denying
Fairfield's corporate existence, and further, from maintaining an
action against Durbano and Garn personally, for three reasons; (1)
the Morses dealt and contracted with Durbano and Gam's association
(Fairfield) as a corporation, thereby creating a corporation by
estoppel; (2) the Morses admitted the corporate existence in their
Answer

and

brought

a

Counterclaim

against

Fairfield

as

a

corporation, thereby acknowledging and admitting the corporate
existence; and

(3) allowing the Morses to maintain an action

against Durbano and Garn would be contrary to public policy.

The

Morses, having made an election between two courses, with knowledge
of the facts, have estopped themselves from pursuing the course
they did not choose.
want

of

corporate

They cannot, in one breath, rely upon the
existence

so

as

to hold

the

individuals

personally liable, and in the next, claim that the corporation does
exist in support of their claim against it.

In other words, the

Morses cannot have their cake and eat it too.

Based upon the

evidence submitted at trial, this court should affirm the trial
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court's finding that Fairfield was a corporation by estoppel at the
time the Agreement was executed.
The Morses

spend

a great deal of time

in their Brief

discussing the Model Business Corporation Act and the official
comments to it.

Since the Model Act has been adopted in one form

or another in every state, it is interesting to survey how other
states have handled

the

"bright-line" argument

found

in the

comments to the Model Act and cited in the Morses' Brief.
According to the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated,
Third Edition, 1992 Supplement, thirty states have adopted a
statute similar to U.C.A. §16-10-139, concerning liability of
persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority, and
all fifty states have adopted a statute similar to U.C.A. §16-1051, that the corporate existence begins upon either the filing of
Articles

or the issuance of a Certificate of Incorporation.

However, in spite of the adoption by so many states of these two
provisions of the Model Act, almost all states still recognize the
doctrines of de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel.
A survey of cases reported only in the last ten years reveals
that the following states currently recognize the doctrine of de
facto corporation:

Connecticut—In re Martin-Trigona, 760 F.2d

1334 (2nd Cir. 1985); Kansas—State ex rel McCain v. Construction
Enterprises, Inc., 631 P. 2d 1240 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Florida—
Ratner v. Central Nat. Bank of Miami, 414 So.2d 210 (Fla. Ct. App.
3 Dist. 1982); New York—Clinton Investors Co. v. Watkins, 536 N.Y.
S.2d 270 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. 1989); Mississippi—Matter of Whatlev,
874 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1989); Illinois—Davane, Inc. v. Monqreiq,
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550 N.E.2d 55 (111. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1990); Arkansas—Committee for
Utility Trimming, Inc. v. Hamilton, 718 S.W.2d 933 (Ark. 1986);
Massachusetts—In re David's & Unique Eatery, 82 B.R. 652 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1987); Ohio—Fleischauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290 (6th
Cir. 1989), cert, denied 493 U.S. 1074 and 494 U.S. 1027 (1989);
Iowa—Adams v. Mt. Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 355 N.W.2d 868 (Iowa
1984); and New Jersey—Cantor, 398 A.2d at 571.
A similar survey of cases cited only during the last ten years
also reveals that the following states currently recognize the
doctrine of corporation by estoppel:

Louisiana—Southern-Gulf

Marine Co. No. 9, Inc. v. Camcraft, Inc., 410 So.2d 1181 (La. Ct.
App. 3 Cir. 1982); Arizona—Spurlock, 694 P.2d at 299; Michigan—
Lettinga, 686 F.2d at 442; Texas—Gensco, Inc. v. Canco Equipment,
Inc. , 737 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Ct. App. Amarillo 1987); Nebraska—
Forker Solar, Inc. v. Knoblauch, 396 N.W.2d 273 (Neb. 1986);
Missouri—Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. JEM Development Corp.,
740 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Minnesota—Arbo Corp. v. Ardan
Marketing/Distribution, Inc., 639 F.Supp. 1512 (D. Minn. 1986);
California—Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F.Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal.
1987); New York—Puma Indus. Consulting, Inc. v. Daal Associates,
Inc. , 808 F.2d 982 (2nd Cir. 1987); Illinois—Davane, 550 N.E.2d at
55; and Georgia—Pinson v. Hartsfield Int'l Commerce Center, 382
S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
A look at reported cases from all states for the past twenty
or thirty years would no doubt reveal many more states that still
recognize the doctrines of de facto corporation and corporation by
estoppel, notwithstanding their adoption of the Model Act.
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In

fact, apparently the only state whose judiciary has construed the
Model Act to abolish corporation by estoppel entirely is Tennessee.
Thus, a review of the Model Act and its adoption by the
various states, as well as case law as cited above, reveals that in
spite of adoption of the Model Act, most states still recognize the
doctrine of de facto corporation and almost all states recognize
the

doctrine

of

corporation

by

estoppel.

Indeed,

as

the

annotations to the Model Act state:
These doctrines evolved at a time when most state
statutes included a significant number of prerequisites
to incorporation; their importance has declined as the
incorporation process has been simplified. Nonetheless,
they continue to be applied or referred to in many modern
decisions involving situations in which the simplified
incorporation procedures have not been fully complied
with.
Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, Third Edition, 1992
Supplement, p. 135

(emphasis added).

Based

upon the above

authority, this court should affirm the trial court's finding that
Fairfield existed at the time of closing on the Carwash both as a
de facto corporation and as a corporation by estoppel.
IX.
The Trust Was Not Prejudiced by the Trial Court's Ruling
on Attorney's Fees.
On March 10, 1992, the trial court entered judgment in favor
of the Trust against Fairfield in the amount of $76,832.30, with
after accruing interest at the statutory rate and a reasonable
attorney's fee.

The Morses promptly filed a Motion for Determin-

ation of Attorney Fees (R. at 2029-30), accompanied by an Affidavit
of Attorney Fees and Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements (R. at
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2031-98).
Response

On March 31, 1992, counsel for Durbano and G a m filed a
(R. at 2106-09), and on April 6, 1992, counsel for

Fairfield filed a Response (R. at 2113-33).
Of particular significance is the fact that on April 1, 1992,
the Morses filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on the issue of
attorney's fees (R. at 2110-12).

It was not until April 10, 1992,

that the trial court ruled on the attorney's fees issue, awarding
$11,243.00 (R. at 2136).

Finally, on April 14, 1992, the Morses

filed a supplemental Affidavit of Attorney Fees (R. at 2137-2203)
and a Reply Memorandum on their Motion (R. at 2204-12).
later,

on

April

Reconsideration

of

15,

1992, the

the Attorney's

Memorandum (R. at 2213-16).

Morses

filed

Fees with

a
an

One day

Motion

for

accompanying

However, on May 12, 1992, the trial

court denied the Motion for Reconsideration (R. at 2230).
The Morses state in their Brief that the Trust was prejudiced
by the trial court's disregard of Rule 4-501 of the Code of
Judicial Administration.

The Morses argue that the trial court

should not have considered the responses to their motion concerning
attorneys fees, because the responses were filed after the deadline
provided in Rule 4-501. However, what the Morses fail to recognize
is that the rule itself contains the remedy for this situation.
"If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition
to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court
for decision as provided in paragraph 1(d) of this rule." Rule 4501(1)(b), Rules of Judicial Administration. The Morses failed to
comply with this provision until after one of the responses was
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filed.

Until a Notice to Submit for Decision is submitted, the

trial court is not at liberty to rule on the motion.

Rule 4-

501(1)(d), Rules of Judicial Administration. Thus, the Morses have
no basis to complain that the trial court considered the responsive
memorandum.
The Morses also argue that the trial court prejudiced the
Trust by ruling on the motion on April 10, 1992, without considering their reply memorandum and revised Affidavit of Attorney Fees,
citing Gillmor v. Cuirmtings, 806 P. 2d 1205 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
However, the holding in Gillmor did not address the failure of a
court to consider a reply memorandum submitted after the same party
had submitted a Notice to Submit for Decision.

The court in

Gillmor addressed a situation where the trial court ruled on a
motion prior to the expiration of time for a responsive memorandum
from the other side. Ici. at 1208.

Since response memorandum are

mandatory under Rule 4-501(1)(b), while reply memorandum are
optional, Rule 4-501(1)(c), Gillmor does not support
the reversal of the trial court's ruling on the issue of attorney's
fees.
The cases cited in Gillmor, which were decided under former
rule 2.8(b), Utah R. Prac. D. & C. Ct., also addressed the failure
of a court to consider a responsive pleading, not the movant's
reply memorandum.

Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood

Exploration, Inc. , 735 P.2d 62, 62-63 (Utah 1987); and K.O. v.
Denison, 748 P.2d 588, 591 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Morses cannot
cite the court to any precedence which would suggest that the trial
court's order on attorney's fees should be set aside.
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Once a

Notice to Submit for Decision had been submitted by the Morses on
their Motion, of necessity they should have withdrawn the Notice,
if they desired to submit a reply memorandum or revised affidavit.
Fairfield should not be penalized by the Morses' failure to do so.
For that reason, this court should not set aside the ruling on
attorney's fees based on any violation of Rule 4-501, Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.
X.
The Trial Court's Award of Attorney's Fees is Supported
by the Record.
The award of reasonable attorneys fees is in the sound
discretion of the trial court.

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764

P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); Jenkins v. Bailev. 676 P.2d 391, 393
(Utah

1984).

attorney's

Initially the Morses requested

fees,

but

later

they

reduced

$112,435.00 in

their

request

to

$88,700.00, apparently in response to the opposing Memoranda. The
trial court found a reasonable fee to be $11,243.00 and awarded
that amount.

The Morses argue that such award was an abuse of

discretion, relying primarily on Dixie State Bank.

However, such

reliance is misplaced, as the facts in that case are strikingly
different from the facts before the court in the case at bar.
In Dixie State Bank, the bank brought a deficiency action on
a vehicle loan, after repossession and sale of the vehicle, seeking
a judgment in the amount of $3,858.84. JEd. at 992. When Brackens'
motion to dismiss was denied, they answered and counterclaimed,
seeking $5,000.00 in general damages and $200,000.00 in punitive
damages, for wrongful repossession of the truck. Id,, at 986-87.
Footnote 3 of the opinion clearly indicates the lack of merit of
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the Brackens' defense and counterclaim, based upon a theory that
the bank's computer converted the payment obligation from monthly
to semi-annually, when such semi-annual payments would not even be
sufficient to pay the current interest. Id.
As further evidence of Brackens' unmeritorious defense and
counterclaim, the parties reached a stipulation of settlement at
the commencement of trial, under which the bank would be paid the
full amount of principal and interest, plus costs, plus attorney's
fees in whatever amount the court found reasonable, and the
Brackens were given 90 days from entry of judgment to satisfy the
judgment, in order to avoid execution. .Id. at 987.

Although the

trial court found attorney's fees in the amount of $4,847.50 to be
reasonable, the court

only

awarded

$1,500.00, citing

public

discontent over the level of attorney's fees and the amount of the
judgment with interest being only $4,748.39, as justification for
the reduction. Id. at 987, 992. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
increased the award of attorney's fees to that which the trial
court found reasonable. .Id., at 991.
As the facts recited above clearly indicate, Dixie State Bank
is not at all analogous to the case at bar.

In this case,

Fairfield filed the Complaint and actively prosecuted its claim
through

the

trial

and

beyond.

Fairfield's

allegation

of

misrepresentation, material breach, and mutual mistake were not
unmeritorious, and the trial court's finding against Fairfield on
its claim is currently on appeal before this court as well.
Fairfield's position on its Complaint was not at all untenable, as
the Bracken's position was on their answer and counterclaim. Thus,
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the conduct of Fairfield in prosecuting its Complaint and defending
against the Counterclaim did not convert a routine action into a
"brouhaha" as the court in Dixie State Bank found the Brackens had
done. .Id. For that reason, the holding in Dixie State Bank, based
upon the facts therein, does not support a finding that the trial
court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the
Morses in the amount of $11,243.00.
The general principles and practical guidelines set out in
Dixie State Bank, however, are applicable and were briefed extensively by Fairfield in its responsive memorandum on the issue of
attorney's fees (R. at 2113-33).

A brief summary applying these

principles to the facts in this action supports the affirmance of
the trial court's award of attorney's fees.
(1) The fee agreement should be in writing—No evidence of any
fee agreement or that any fees were actually paid was ever
presented to the trial court.

If the fee agreement was for an

hourly rate, the agreement should have been produced so that the
rates contained therein could be compared to the Affidavit of
Attorney Fees submitted to the court.

If, on the other hand, the

fee agreement was contingent, such should also be produced, because
an award based upon hours incurred would be inappropriate.

Based

upon Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5, counsel for the Morses
would only be entitled to the percentage found in the agreement.
Without the fee agreement, the trial court is left to its own
discretion in awarding attorney's fees.
(2) The nature of the legal work performed must be specified-Instead of including detailed explanations of time spent, counsel
62

for the Morses often resorted to mere generalities and "padding"
using such explanations as "analysis of the issues" or "legal
research."

Again, without descriptive entries, the court is left

to its discretion on the award of attorney's fees. The Morses may
have attempted to remedy this situation by filing a revised
Affidavit of Attorney Fees. However, to recreate the detail behind
such padded entries by memory years later would be impossible. For
that reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to consider the revised Affidavit of Attorney Fees and in
awarding attorney's fees in the amount of $11,243.00.
(3) The reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the
case—It is clear that the Morses' counsel spent most of their time
pursuing the Counterclaim against Durbano and Garn individually,
the perceived "deep pockets," after admitting in their Answer the
corporate existence of Fairfield.

The trial court found the

Counterclaim to be meritless against the individuals, which finding
should be affirmed in this appeal.
prosecution are not awardable.
858 (Utah 1984).

Fees incurred in unsuccessful

Trayner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856,

Because the billing entries of the Morses'

counsel made no distinction between fruitless pursuits and those
that resulted in judgment against Fairfield, the trial court was
again left to its discretion in awarding attorney's fees.
Counsel

for

the Morses

also

spent

significant

time on

frivolous squabbles regarding procedure and discovery, and in
filing baseless motions such as for bad faith and sanctions, among
others, preventing the case from going forward and needlessly
incurring additional attorney's fees.
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The Morses' counsel also

assigned at least nine attorneys to the case, five of which were
partners in the firm, resulting in obvious and expensive duplication of professional services.

All of the time spent on the

meritless Counterclaim against Durbano and Garn, frivolous motions
and discovery squabbles, and time for new attorneys to get up to
speed on the action, are unreasonable and such time should not be
awarded.

The trial court properly exercised its discretion in

determining how much of the requested fees were for unreasonable
time spent.
(4) The novelty and difficulty of the issues involved—The
Utah Supreme Court has held that the novelty and difficulty of the
issues involved is an important aspect for the trial court to
consider in awarding attorney's fees.

1^.

The issues in the

instant case involve long standing and well settled principles of
law.

Examples of this are de facto corporation, as discussed by

the Utah Supreme Court in Vincent Drug, supra. 407 P. 2d at 683, and
contract interpretation, finding the intent of the parties within
the four corners of the instrument, as stated also by the Utah
Supreme Court in Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d
1201, 1205 (Utah 1983).
and was

These issues, upon which the case hinged

subsequently decided, are clearly neither novel nor

difficult. For that reason, attorney's fees in this action should
have been minimal, which is no doubt only one of the reasons why
the trial court awarded the amount it did.
(5) The fee award should have some relationship to the amount
in controversy and the amount recovered—The Utah Supreme Court has
consistently held that there should be some reasonable relationship
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between the award and (1) the amount in controversy, Dixie State
Bank, 764 P.2d at 989, and (2) the amount recovered, Travnor, 688
P.2d at 858.
$45,000.00

plus

The amount awarded on the promissory note was
interest.

Had

the Morses

not

filed

their

Counterclaim seeking personal liability on the part of Durbano and
Garn, their defense of Fairfield's Complaint and prosecution of
their simple claim for breach of promissory note could have both
been accomplished at a cost not exceeding approximately $12,000.00.
The trial court, with no evidence of a written fee agreement, only
general and non-descript evidentiary support for the fees, and
evidence of incredible inefficiency involving issues that are
neither unique nor complex, using its best discretion, awarded
attorney's fees in the amount of $11,423.00.

Based upon the,

record, this court should affirm such award.
XI.
Fairfield Should be Awarded
Appeal.
The

basis

for

Fairfield's

its Attorney's Fees on
Complaint

concerning the sale of the Carwash.

was

the

Agreement

The Agreement provides for

attorney's fees to the prevailing party in the event of breach
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, p. 13, I 22).

Therefore, if Fairfield is

successful on this appeal, it should be awarded its attorney's fees
incurred in the appeal, as well as those incurred in the underlying
action.

Trayner, 688 P.2d at 858 n.7; Management Services Corp.

v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980). Similarly, if Durbano and Garn are successful on this appeal, Fairfield
should also be awarded its attorney's fees incurred on behalf of
Durbano and Garn.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the record and the arguments herein, Fairfield
requests that this court (1) reverse the judgment of the trial
court and order rescission of the Agreement on the basis of
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, breach
of contract, and/or mutual mistake; (2) reverse the trial court and
grant Fairfield's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint,
adding

causes

of

action

for

constructive

trust,

fraudulent

transfer, and injunctive relief; (3) reverse the trial court and
grant Fairfield's Motion to Set Aside the Fraudulent Conveyance of
the Morses' interest in the promissory note to their Trusts; (4)
reverse the trial court and grant Fairfield's Motion for Order
Declaring Trusts Invalid, declaring the Morses' Trusts invalid; (5)
reverse the trial court and grant Fairfield's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, dismissing the Counterclaim as to Fairfield, if
not inconsistent with the other rulings on appeal; (6) reverse the
trial court and order that the Morses' Bankruptcy Trustee, David
Gladwell, be joined as the real party in interest in this action;
and (7) award Fairfield all attorney's fees incurred in this appeal
and in the underlying action below, including fees incurred on
behalf of Durbano and Garn.
Based upon the record and the arguments herein, Durbano and
Garn request that this court affirm the trial court's finding that
Fairfield existed at the time of closing as a de facto corporation
and also as a corporation by estoppel, and that Durbano and Garn
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have no personal liability on the judgment entered by the trial
court against Fairfield.
DATED this

Lp

^
day of Docombor/ 109-2-^
DURBANO AND ASSOCIATES

Douglas M. Durbartb
Walter T. Merriil
Attorneys for Appellee/CrossAppellant
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL

^ot^rt' K. Hilder^
Attorneys for Appellees
Durbano and Garn
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES,
INC., a Utah corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

900906228

Plaintiff/
Counterclaim Defendant,
vs,
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE,
individually and as Trustees
for the WAYNE L. MORSE
Irrevocable Family Trust, and
DAVID GLADWELL,
Defendants/
Counterclaimants,
vs.
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and
KEVIN S. GARN,
Involuntary Plaintiffs/
Counterclaim Defendants.

This matter came on regularly for trial, commencing the
15th day of October, 1991, with Douglas Durbano appearing on
behalf of the plaintiff; James L. Christensen and Michael Lee
appearing on behalf of the stipulated real party defendant, the
Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust; and with Craig G.
Adamson and Eric Lee appearing on behalf of the involuntary

nni nr/>
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PAGE TWO

plaintiffs/counterclaim

defendants,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Durbano

and

Garn.

The

matter of the issues raised by the pleadings filed in this case
were fully presented, argued and submitted, and the matter of
the Court's decision thereon was taken under advisement.

The

Court having thereafter reviewed the evidence, together with
the submissions of counsel, and the arguments of counsel, now
makes its ruling and decision on said issues, as follows:
This

action

was

commenced

by

the

plaintiff

seeking

to

rescind a contract whereby plaintiff agreed to purchase a car
wash from the defendant.
rescission

claimed

defendant,

and

Plaintiff has alleged as grounds for

fraud

breach

of

and
the

misrepresentation
sales

mistake based on mistake of fact.

contract

of

and

the

a mutual

Defendant has denied the

allegations and seeks by Counterclaim against the individual
involuntary plaintiffs to recover under a promissory note given
to purchase the car wash.
personal

liability,

corporation,

to wit:

The

claiming

involuntary

the

American

purchaser

Vending

plaintiffs deny
was

Services,

in

fact

a

Inc., the

named plaintiff.
It is undisputed and the evidence supports a finding that
the documents regarding the sale and purchase of the car wash
were

signed

by purchasers

in the name of American Vending
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Services, Inc.
Gam

as

MEMORANDUM DECISION

None of the documents were signed by Durbano or

individuals.

It

is

further

undisputed

that

the

corporate documents were filed subsequent to the signing of the
sale documents, and that no corporation existed at the time the
sale was

concluded.

Durbano

and G a m ,

however, claim

that

there was a de facto corporation, or a corporation by estoppel,
because defendant knew that it was dealing with a corporation,
rather than a partnership comprised of Durbano and Garn.
The Court will find that there was no evidence of fraud or
misrepresentation, breach of contract, or mutual mistake which
would

permit

plaintiff

American

Vending

Services,

Inc.

the

right to rescind the contract or the promissory note.
The Court will find that the evidence supports a finding
that the plaintiff was a de facto corporation at the time of
the signing of the contract to purchase and the promissory note
in question
knowledge

in that the defendants were aware

of

the

fact

that

they

were

of

dealing

and had
with

a

corporation, rather than the individual involuntary plaintiffs.
Based upon the foregoing ruling, the Court will
rule

that

rescission.

plaintiffs

are

not

entitled

to

their

further

claim

for

The Court further finds that defendant Wayne L.

Morse Irrevocable Family Trust is entitled to and is awarded a

03
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MORSE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judgment on the contract and promissory note for the unpaid
balance thereon against plaintiff American Vending Services,
Inc.

Defendant's

claim

for

Judgment

against

involuntary

plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants Douglas M. Durbano and
Kevin

S.

Garn

is denied.

Defendant

is

awarded

its costs

taxable against the plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc.
Dated this

day of November','

JAMES S. SAWJKA"
[•RICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the

foregoing Memorandum

this 1 Rj^day

Decision,

to the

of November, 1991:

Douglas M. Durbano
Attorney for Plaintiff
3340 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84403
Craig G. Adamson
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendants
310 S. Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
James L. Christensen
Michael Lee
Attorneys for Defendants
215 S. State, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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MAR 1 0 1992
Craig G. Adamson (0024)
Eric P. Lee (4870)
Attorneys for Involuntary Plaintiffs
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES,
INC., n\k\a Fairfield Car
Wash Corporation,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE,
individually and as Trustees
for the Wayne L. Morse and
Dianne L. Morse Irrevocable
Family Trust; DAVID L.
GLADWELL, Bankruptcy Trustee,
Defendants/
Counterclaiinants,
v.
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and
KEVIN S. GARN,
Involuntary Plaintiffs/
Counterclaim Defendants.
oooOooo
This matter came on for trial commencing on October 15, 1991.
Douglas M. Durbano appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, James L.
Christensen

appeared

on behalf of the stipulated

real party

defendant, the Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust, and Craig
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G. Adamson and Eric P. Lee appeared on behalf of the involuntary
Plaintiffs.

Having received exhibits, heard the testimony of the

witnesses and the arguments of counsel, the Court took the matter
under advisement and issued its Memorandum Decision on November 18,
1991. Based on the Memorandum Decision, the evidence and arguments
of counsel at trial, the Court hereby enters its,

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Wayne L. Morse and Dianne L. Morse were the owners and

operators of a car wash and office building located in Layton,
Utah.
2.

In the Summer of 1985, involuntary plaintiffs Douglas M.

Durbano and Kevin S. Garn determined that they would form a
corporation to purchase the car wash and office building from the
Morses.

Throughout the negotiations for the purchase, the Morses

knew that Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn intended to form a corporation
for this purpose.
3.

Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn, as incorporators, decided on

the corporate name American Food Service, Inc. and filed articles
of incorporation with the State of Utah.

The articles were

rejected and returned to Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn because the name
American Food Services, Inc. conflicted with an existing corporate
name.
4.

Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn then changed the corporate name

to American Food and Vending Services and submitted articles of
2

incorporation a second time.
because of name conflict.

The articles were again rejected

Both sets of articles were submitted

prior to July, 1985.
5.

On June 28, 1985, Mr. Durbano obtained preapproval for

the use of the name American Vending Services, Inc. for the
corporation.
6.

The transaction closed on July 10, 1985 when American

Vending Services, Inc. as buyer and Mr. and Mrs. Morse as sellers
executed a Purchase and Sales Agreement.
7.

None of the documents generated in connection with the

sale of the car wash and office building were executed by either
Mr. Durbano or Mr. Garn as buyer. All documents were prepared for
signature by and were signed by American Vending Services, Inc.
8.

An attorney representing Mr. and Mrs. Morse reviewed the

transaction documents prior to closing and made no objection to a
corporate buyer.
9.

Following the closing, American Vending Services, Inc.

continued doing business by obtaining a checking account, operating
the car wash and office building, issuing stock and holding
meetings.
10.

Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn's efforts to file articles of

incorporation and obtain preapproval for the name American Vending
Services prior to closing constitute a bona fide attempt to
organize the corporation.

3
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11.

Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn intended to have the articles

of incorporation for American Vending Services, Inc. filed prior to
closing, but failed to accomplish the filing until August 19, 1985
due to the distraction of Mr. Durbano opening a new law office just
prior to the closing, the closing itself and the process of
commencing business.
12.

Due to what Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn believed to be

misrepresentations regarding the income potential of the car wash
and office building, American Vending Services, Inc. instituted
this action on October 31, 1985 seeking rescission of the purchase
transaction.

In their initial Answer, Mr. and Mrs. Morse admitted

the corporate existence of American Vending Services, Inc.
13.

Mr. and Mrs. Morse intended to contract with American

Vending Services, Inc., rather than Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn
individually.
14. Due to a name change in 1990, American Vending Services,
Inc. is now known as Fairfield Car Wash Corporation.
15. The evidence concerning fraud, misrepresentation, breach
of contract and mutual mistake was insufficient to permit American
Vending Services, Inc. the right to rescind the contract.
16.

The parties1 agreement provides for the recovery of a

reasonable attorney's fee upon breach.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby
makes and enters its,
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc. was a de facto

corporation at the time it purchased the subject car wash and
office building.
2.

Plaintiff

American

Vending

Services,

Inc.

was

a

corporation by estoppel at the time it purchased the subject car
wash and office building.
3.

Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust is

estopped from denying the corporate existence of Plaintiff American
Vending Services, Inc.
4.

Plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc. breached the

parties1

agreement by failing to pay all sums due under the

Promissory Note.
5.

Plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc. failed to

establish the elements of its claims for fraud, misrepresentation,
breach of contract and mutual mistake.
6.

Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust failed

to prove the elements of its claims against Mr. Durbano and Mr.
Garn and its claims against them should be dismissed.
7.

Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust is

entitled to damages against Plaintiff American Vending Services,
Inc. only in the amount of $76,832.30, with costs, interest and a
reasonable attorney's fee in an amount to be determined pursuant to
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-505 (1989).
5
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DATED t h i s

/O

day of

r

HONipRABLE JAMES S^ SAWAYA
s t r i c t Court j u d g e

Approved a s t o form:

James L.

Christensen
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Dafoity Clerk

Craig G. Adamson (0024)
Eric P. Lee (4870)
Attorneys for Involuntary Plaintiffs
310 South Main Street
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES,
INC.,
n/k/a FAIRFIELD
CAR WASH CORPORATION,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE,
individually and as Trustees
for the Wayne L. Morse and
Dianne L. Morse Irrevocable
Family Trust; DAVID L.
GLADWELL, Bankruptcy Trustee,
Defendants/
Counterclaimants,
v.
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and
KEVIN S. GARN,
Involuntary Plaintiffs/
Counterclaim Defendants.
OOOOOOO

00202R

This matter came on for trial before the above-captioned
Court commencing on October 15, 1991. Douglas M. Durbano appeared
on behalf of Plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc., James L.
Christensen

appeared

on behalf

of the stipulated

real party

defendant, the Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust, and Craig
G. Adamson and Eric P. Lee appeared on behalf of the involuntary
Plaintiffs Douglas M. Durbano and Kevin S. Gam.

Based on the

Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of even date, and
good cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust is

awarded Judgment against Plaintiff American Vending Services, Inc.,
n\k\a

Fairfield

Car Wash Corporation

in the total amount of

$76,832.30, with after accruing interest at the statutory rate
until paid and a reasonable attorney's fee in an amount to be
determined pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4505 (1989) .
2.

Plaintiff American Vending Service, Inc. ' s claims against

Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust are dismissed
with prejudice.

2
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3.

Defendant Wayne L. Morse Irrevocable Family Trust's

claims against involuntary Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants
Douglas M. Durbano and Kevin S. Gajrp ar^ dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

/&

day of Ttft^TVTi^,199;

JLE JAMES S. ^fiWAYA
5t Court Judge
Approved as to form:
James L. Christensen
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D/££

James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639
Mark J. Morrise, USB No. 3840
Wallace J. Calder, USB No. 5674
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801/534-0909

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
DETERMINATION OF ATTORNEY FEES

v.
WAYNE L. MORSE and DIANNE L.
MORSE, individually and as
Trustees of the WAYNE L. MORSE
Irrevocable Family Trust,
Defendants and
Counterclaimants,

Civil No. 900906228CV
(Judge James S. Sawaya)

v.
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and KEVIN
S. GARN,
Involuntary
Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim
Defendants.

6?/72?6 3

Defendants and counterclaimants7 Motion for Determination of
Attorney Fees having been considered by the court based upon a
Notice to Submit for Decision dated April 1, 1992, and the court,
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pursuant to that notice, having considered the motion, supporting
ana opposing memoranda and affidavit of James L. Christensen, and
not having considered defendants' reply memorandum and the
additional affidavit of James L. Christensen,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that defendants' claimed attorney fees of $112,435.00 is
excessive.

The Court awards attorney fees to defendants of one-

tenth of the claimed amount, i.e. $11,243.00, and costs of
$1,980.17.

The judgment entered in favor of defendants dated

March 10, 1992 is hereby amended to include the attorney fees and
costs awarded herein, for a total judgment of $90,055.47 plus
accrued interest.

DATED this

day of

"^&<*y

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

Hotaorable James S.
Third^District Court Judge

002PQ9

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
To:

Counsel for plaintiffs and involuntary plaintiffs and
counterclaim defendants:

You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for
defendants will submit the foregoing Order to Judge James S.
Sawaya for his signature upon the expiration of (5) days from the
date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three days for
mailing, or upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date
you receive this proposed order, if hand-delivered, unless
written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule
4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1988). Please
govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this Vfr-tikday of

, 1992.

\A\A>\

CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

\f^(Jj^M
James L. Christens^
Wallace J. Calder
Attorneys for defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the A g ^ d a y of
1992, I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to:
Douglas M. Durbano
Durbano & Associates
Attorney for Plaintiff
3340 Harrison Blvd. #200
Ogden, UT 84403
Craig G. Adamson
Dart Adamson and Kasting
Attorney for Involuntary Plaintiffs
310 South Main #1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
David L. Gladwell
4185 Harrison Blvd.
P.O. Box 12069
Ogden, UT 84412
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Douglas M. Durbano (#4209)
Walter T. Merrill (#6003)
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3340 Harrison Boulevard, #200
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 621-4111

£L!£

j \ DeputyClerk
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
FAIRFIELD CAR WASH CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, f/k/a
American Vending Services, Inc.,

ORDER
Re:

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Amendment of Parties
to Pleadings and
Temporary Restraining
Order

vs
BRENT DOPP, as Trustee for the
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE
IRREVOCABLE FAMILY TRUSTS,
Defendants/Counterclaimants

Civil No. 900906228
Judge James S. Sawaya

Plaintiff having moved this court for a Temporary Restraining
Order, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction, pursuant to
Rule 65(A)(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to prevent or stop
any alleged wrongful execution on the Judgment entered March 10,
1992, said Motion having come on for hearing on July 27, 1992,
Plaintiff having further moved this court to amend the pleadings in
this action to correct the name of the Plaintiff (the Corporate
Plaintiff having properly changed its name), and to delete the
Involuntary Plaintiffs, who were dismissed from the action, the
court having considered the Motions, Pleadings and argument of
counsel, and good cause appearing,

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion for
Injunctive Relief is denied, the court finding that such motion is
more properly brought in a separate civil action to be filed by the
actual parties who are effected by the alleged wrongful execution;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the
Compliant is granted, in that only the true parties in interest
shall be named in the caption of all pleadings, and the caption
specifically shall state and name or identify the parties as
follows:

FAIRFIELD CAR WASH CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, f/k/a
American Vending Services, Inc.,

:

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

vs.
BRENT DOPP, as Trustee for the
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE
IRREVOCABLE FAMILY TRUSTS,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

:

Civil No. 900906228
Judge James S. Sawaya

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the captions in all pleadings,
executions, garnishments and orders, created after the judgment

AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES V. MORSE
Civil No. 900906228
Page 2

dated March 10, 1992, and prior to July 27, 1992, are herebyamended where appropriate to conform with this Order.
DATED this

%

day of V ^ r * '. 1992.
BY THJL4£URT:

.JMES S. SAWAY;
district Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, this
1992 to the following:
James L. Christensen
Mark J. Morrise
Wallace J. Calder
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111

Secretary

(2\pldgs\870078.der)
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day of July,

UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT

25-6-5

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Allegation of insolvency.
Determination of insolvency.
Allegation of insolvency.
Allegation of insolvency in a complaint in an
action to set aside a conveyance was sufficient
as against contention that it was a conclusion,
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198,48 P.2d 513,101
A.L.R. 532 (1935).
Determination of insolvency.
The determination of insolvency under this
section is not the same as the determination of

insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, as this section requires merely a showing that the party's
a8sets ^
n o t 8 u f f i c i e n t to m e e t liabilities as
fhsy
become due Meyer y Q ^ ^ ^
Cor?f
569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977).
In an action by a creditor to set aside an
allegedly fraudulent conveyance of real estate
by a debtor, the plaintiff did not demonstrate
that the debtor was insolvent where the only
evidence was that the debtor submitted two
checks that were returned unpaid. Furniture
Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398
(Utah 1984).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Imputation of insolvency as defamatory, 49 A.L.R.3d 163.

Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
«=» 57(1).

25-6-4. Value — Transfer.
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured
or satisfied. However, value does not include an unperformed promise made
other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support
to the debtor or another person.
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor
and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact
substantially contemporaneous.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 4; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-4.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
the transfer or obligation; and the debtor:
25

25-6-5

FRAUD

(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they
became due.
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may
be given, among other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor
had been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial
debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-5.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59

became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors
as a misdemeanor, § 76-6-511.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assignments.
Badges of fraud.
Construction and application.
Constructive trust.
Conveyances between relatives.
Evidence.
Fair consideration.
"Good faith" transfer.
Mortgagor remaining in possession.
Parent and child.
Assignments.
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, unaccompanied by change of possession, is fraudulent per se as to execution creditors of, or subsequent purchasers from, seller or assignor
does not necessarily apply to assignments for
benefit of creditors, but long delay in taking
possession is circumstance from which fraud
may be prima facie inferred. Snyder v. Murdock, 20 Utah 419, 59 P. 91 (1899).

Whether an assignment of an interest in an
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or was made for such
purpose, depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, as gathered from the badges of fraud present.
Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063
(1942).
Badges of fraud.
Although actual fraudulent intent must be
shown to hold a conveyance fraudulent, its existence may be inferred from the presence of
certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud."
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420
(Utah 1986).
"Badges of fraud," from which actual intent
may be inferred, include, inter alia, a debtor's
(1) continuing in possession and evidencing the
prerequisites of property ownership after having formally conveyed all his interest in the
property, (2) making a conveyance in anticipa-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN VENDING
SERVICES, INC., a Utah
corporation,

CIVIL NO. 900906228
D£PJOS-I-TTON
J . SCOTT BUEHLE~]

Plaintiff,
TAKEN:

MAY 2 3 ,

1991

vs.
REPORTED

WAYNE L. and DIANNE L.
MORSE, individually and
as Trustees for the
WAYNE L. MORSE
Irrevocable Family Trust,

BY:

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR

COPY

Defendants/
Counterclaimants,
vs.
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and
KEVIN S. GARN,
Involuntary
Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim
Defendants.

Deposition of J. SCOTT BUEHLER. taken on behalf
of the Plaintiff, at 3340 Harrison Bouelvard, Suite
200, Ogden, Utah, commencing at 10:30 a.m. on May
23, 1991, before RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, pursuant
to Subpoena.
*

*

*

*

STACY & ASSOCIATES
717 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 328-1188

1
2
3

"administer"?
Q

Did you ever receive it in your capacity

as trustee, countersign a check, deposit it?

4

A

Not to my knowledge.

5

Q

In your capacity as a trustee, have you

6

been requested by the beneficiaries or settlors of

7

the trust to pursue any legal action against the

8

signers of Exhibit 3?

9

A

Once again, I would have to decline to

10

answer on the ground that the lines between my

11

capacity as trustee and attorney are blurred and, in

12

view of that, any communications I would have had

13

with regard to that I would have to say are

14

privileged.

15

Q

16

Do you still serve as the trustee to

either the Diane or Wayne L. Morse Family Trust?

17

A

I do not.

18

Q

You apparently resigned.

19

A

That's correct.

20

Q

And you didn't bring with you today any

21
22

documents evidencing your resignation.
A

No, I did not.

I will represent that I

23

did resign -- I believe it was on February the 10th

24

of 1986.

25

And Mrs. Morse.

I did that in the form of a letter to Mr.
That letter contains other

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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1

information which I believe to be of a privileged

2

nature.

3
4
5

Q

Do you know who the successor trustee is

or was back when you resigned?
A

I do not.

I know that Brent Dopp is

6

named as the successor or trustee in the trust

7

document.

8
9

Q

And has he had any communications with

you in regards to administering any assets of the

10

trust?

11

A

Not to my recollection.

12

Q

And you've never represented Brent Dopp,

13
14

have you?
A

I have represented Webber Real Estate

15

Company on and off and Brent Dopp is the broker.

16

may have consulted with me from time to time with

17

regard to matters pertaining to his real estate

18

company.

19

representing Brent in any kind of a private or

20

personal capacity.

21

Q

I have no recollection of ever

Have you had any communication with Brent

22

at all in regards to his responsibility as a

23

trustee?

24
25

A

He

If I had any communication with him at

all, it would have been around the time that the

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN VENDING
SERVICES, INC., a Utah
corporation,

CIVIL NO. 900906228
DEPOSITION OF:
BRENT A. DOPP

Plaintiff,
TAKEN:

APRIL 18, 1991

vs.
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L.
MORSE, individually and
as Trustees for the
WAYNE L. MORSE
Irrevocable Family Trust,

REPORTED BY:
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR

Defendants/
Counterclaimants,
vs.
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and
KEVIN S. GARN,

ORIGINAL

Involuntary
Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim
Defendants.

Deposition of BRENT A. DOPP, taken on behalf of
the Plaintiff, at 3340 Harrison Bouelvard, Suite
200, Ogden, Utah, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on April
18, 1991, before RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, pursuant
to Subpoena.
STACY & ASSOCIATES
717 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 328-1188

1

(Whereupon Deposition
Exhibits 1 and 2 were marked
for identification.)

2
3

Q

4

2 together.

5

A

No.

6

Q

Have you seen them before, to the best of

7

Do you recognize these documents?

your recollection?

8
9

Mr. Dopp, I'm showing you Exhibits 1 and

A

I honestly don't remember.

I don't think

I have, but I don't remember.

10

Q

As the title indicates, these are trust

11

agreements that were set up by Wayne and Diane

12

Morse.

13

prepared, I believe, January 15th of 1984; is that

14

correct?

15
16

A

That's what it says here on the paper,

Q

Are you aware that you are a named

yes.

17
18

They're irrevocable family trusts that were

trustee in these trusts?

19

A

I'm aware that I was asked at one point

20

if I would be willing to do that.

I said that I

21

would, yes.

22

Q

Do you recall when that was?

23

A

No.

It was probably back somewhere

24

around then, but I have no idea.

25

when.

I don't remember

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

1

Q

Then I take it you weren't involved in

2

the creation of these trusts at all; is that

3

correct?

4

A

No, I was not.

5

Q

Do you know who the beneficiaries of the

6

trusts are?

7

A

No, I don't.

8

Q

I'd like to have you turn to page two, if

9

you would, of either one.

The trusts are

10

identically worded, I believe.

In paragraph 1.2, it

11

names the beneficiaries of the trust as Collette

12

Morse and Jessica Morse.

13

individuals?

Do you know these two

14

A

That's Diane and Wayne's children.

15

Q

How old are they; do you know?

16
17
18

approximately, if you don't know their exact age.
A

Oh, I honestly don't.

I think Collette

is 10 or 11, and Jessica, I think, is 8.

19

Q

Today?

20

A

Well, I don't know.

21

Q

I don't mean this specific date.

22

Just

That's their age today?
I'm guessing.
I mean

as opposed to back in '84.

23

A

Oh, yes.

24

Q

You're giving me their age currently?

25

A

Current, right.

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

1
2

Q

You've never received any documents

concerning the trust?

3

A

Not to my knowledge, no.

4

Q

Do you know what assets are in the trust?

5

A

I have no idea.

6

Q

Have you done anything for the benefit of

7

the beneficiaries of the trust since February of

8

1986?

9

A

No.

10

Q

And you're not doing anything currently

11

then, I understand.

12

A

No.

13

Q

Do you understand what your duties are as

14

a trustee of a trust?

15

A

No, I don't.

16

Q

Are you familiar with a promissory note

17

executed by American Vending, Inc. for the benefit

18

of Wayne and Diane Morse as trustees of these two

19

trusts?

20

A

No, I'm not.

21

Q

Have you ever seen that document?

22

A

Not that I can recall, no.

23

Q

Do you know if the Morses' children are

24
25

still the beneficiaries of these trusts?
A

I have no idea.

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

8

i

Q

Has it been your intention since you

2

agreed to be an alternate trustee in these trusts,

3

was it your intention then and has it been since

4

then, to act in that capacity if called upon to do

5

so?

6

A

I would have had to have more

7

information.

8

it.

9

it would involve or anything about it, so I -- you

They asked if I would be willing to do

At the time I said yes, but I had no idea what

10

know, I can't answer that without knowing more about

11

it.

12
13
14

Q

Did you say yes with the intention of not

doing it?
A

Well, I said I would be willing to do it,

15

but I needed to know more -- you know, know more

16

about it.

17

there's been no more instruction or no more talk to

18

me about doing it since that one time.

19

Q

I have no idea what it involves.

And

Have you been contacted in the last year

20

by either the Morses or their attorney, Mike Lee, or

21

Jim Christensen, concerning your position as

22

trustee?

23

A

No, I haven't.

The only contact I've had

24

with them concerning what we're talking about today

25

is that I would be coming for a deposition, and

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

i.

that's it.

2

Q

Did they call you concerning this

3

deposition?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

What did they say to you?

6

A

Well, it was on the time situation,

7

wanting to know if the times that were changed, if

8

there was a problem in that.

9

Q

Who is it that actually contacted you?

10

A

Mike Lee.

11

Q

Mike Lee.

And that was the only thing

12

that he talked to you about was the day of the

13

deposition?

14

A

He indicated that it would be on the

15

trust and that was basically the extent of the

16

conversation.

17

MR. MERRILL:

18

(Whereupon the taking of the deposition

19
20

I think that's it.

was concluded at 10:15 a.m.)
*

*

*

*

21
22

23
24
25

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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Douglas M. Durbano (#4209)
EJURBANO & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
Harrison Professional Plaza
3340 Harrison Boulevard, #2.00
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 621-4111
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHELLE KIRCHHEFER

vs.
WAYNE L. and DIANNE L. MORSE,
individually and as Trustees for
the WAYNE L. MORSE Irrevocable
Family Trust, and DAVID GLADWELL,
Defendants/Counterclaimants,
vs.

Civil No. 900906228
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO and
KEVIN S. GARN,
Judge James S. Sawaya
Involuntary Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim Defendants,
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

)
)SS
)

Michelle Kirchhefer, being first duly sworn upon his oath
deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of 21 and competent to be a witness

herein.

I am personally familiar with this matter, and all

statements made herein are made upon personal knowledge, unless

otherwise

stated

that

such statement

is upon information and

belief.
2.

That I was the .closing agent, employed by Bonneville

Ti.tle jfka American

Title Company, during

the time period of

approximately July 10, 1985, and was the individual who conducted
the closing of the Fairfield Carwash, between American Vending
Services, Inc. and Wayne L. and Dianne L. Morse.
3.

Closing

is dated July

10, 1985, with all documents

having been prepared in the name of American Vending Services,
Inc., a Utah corporation as the buyer.
4.

In regards to scheduling the buyer and seller to appear

at the closing, and sign documents, it is always my policy to
keep the buyer and seller separate in order to avoid potential
conflicts.

To the best of my knowledge, in regards to the Carwash

closing, that the Morses came in and signed the closing documents
but

that

the

officers

for American

Vending

Services, Inc.

(Douglas M. Durbano and Kevin S. Garn) had trouble scheduling a
time to close due to numerous time commitments and therefore the
officers of American Vending Services came to the office and
closed at a separate time than that of the Morses.
5.
Douglas

I am informed that the Morses have represented that
M.

Durbano

told

them, at the time of closing, that

American Vending Services, Inc. was not a corporation but merely
a dba by which he and Kevin S. Garn do business.
AFFIDAVIT OF
-2-

I have no

recollection of such a statement ever having been made.

If in

fact it would have been made, I would have known that such a
statement was false, and that the documents did not comply with
the understanding of the parties, and would have so informed the
Morses,

and

either

discontinued

the closing or altered the

closing documents to properly reflect the parties agreement.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this

day of July, 1991.

Sv&prn to and subscribed before me this ^/SY
2 * T day of

LL
ILL

, 1991

Residing i n : ^ g ^ L

NOTARY PUBLIC

JANETTE SNYDER

My Commission Expires: %/ff)

tMOHantton Blvd. #200
O0*MMto«44O9
Wf CtMMlMiOfl ExpiflM

STAR OP UTAH
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